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Article 6

Articles
"CASES ON BOTH SIDES": PATTERNS OF ARGUMENT IN
LEGAL DISPUTE-NEGOTIATION
ROBERTJ. CONDLIN*

I.

INTRODUCTION

After their first dispute negotiations' law students report that
legal argument never convinces anyone. "There are cases on both
sides," they say, "which are equally strong, and arguing about them
wastes time because it only produces impasse." 2 As they become
"experienced," students try to proceed directly to the trading of
offers, but usually without success. They find that they must return
to argument, if only to settle novel questions or ones on which there
is disagreement about applicable norms, but they do so grudgingly
and without much faith in the enterprise's usefulness. Practicing
lawyers are not much different. They try to leave substantive law
implicit and work out disputes by appeals to shared categories of
what cases are worth. 3 Like students, they see argument as counterproductive, and use it only as a last resort.
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Maryland.
Several people have commented helpfully on earlier drafts and I am grateful to
them. Special thanks are due to Tom White who developed the Lerch problem discussed
in sections IV and V and Steve Saltzburg, counsel to the real "Lerch", who taught me
prison transfer law.
1. These include both simulated negotiations in law school courses and settlement
of actual disputes as part of clinical work. "Dispute-negotiation" is the settlement of
disputes arising out of past events. The paradigm example is the settlement of a lawsuit.
It is to be differentiated from "rulemaking negotiation," which is the establishment of
rules to govern future conduct. An example of the latter is the negotiation of a business
contract. Both types are to be distinguished from criminal dispute-settlement, or plea
bargaining. See Eisenberg, Private Ordering Through Negotiation: Dispute-Settlement and
Rulemaking, 89 HARV. L. REV. 637, 638 (1976). For another typology, seeJ. WILLIAMS,
LEGAL NEGOTIATION AND SETrLEMENT 1-5 (1983) (dividihg the types of negotiation into
transactions, civil disputes, labor/management negotiations, and criminal cases). This
Article is about argument only in civil dispute-negotiation.
2. There is no more predictable assertion in all of dispute-negotiation. Students
express this view in several ways and I have quoted the most common.
3. See generally Galanter, Worlds of Deals: Using Negotiation to Teach About Legal Process,
34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 268, 272-73 (1984) (discussion of bargaining "arenas"); G. Bellow,
Proposed Research 27-30 (1975) (unpublished manuscript on file with author) (discussion of lawyer categorization of cases into "slots").
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These views are surprising. Legal disputes typically consist of
disagreements about the nature and extent of legal rights and obligations; 4 and resolving these differences, or at least discussing what
a court would do with them, would seem to be logically prior to
reaching a settlement. As the embodiment of the disputants' substantive rights, argument is also the element of negotiation most directly related to the justice of a settlement. In fact, in a basically just
legal system, the justice of a negotiated outcome would seem to exist, at a minimum, to the extent the parties' competing legal claims
are raised, debated and resolved. While argument is not all of negotiation, therefore, it is an essential part, and it is anomalous that
students and lawyers report as they do.5
This Article examines that anomaly by analyzing arguments appearing in transcripts of simulated dispute-negotiations. Over a
five-year period, approximately one hundred teams of negotiators
were asked to settle a hypothetical lawsuit involving the constitutionally questionable transfer of an inmate of the Virginia prison
system. Each of these negotations was videotaped, and from these
tapes representative excerpts of negotiation argument have been
isolated and transcribed. Three of those transcripts are reproduced
here.
In the course of the analysis, several conclusions emerge. Negotiation argument is seen as more simplistic, chaotic, predictable,
and illogical than is generally believed to be the case, partaking
more of stylized dance or game-playing than of political discourse
or analytical investigation. These qualities suggest that it is discounted in negotiation because it ought to be. The analysis also
considers the related question of why intelligent lawyers and law
students would make ineffectual arguments, and tentative answers

4. A willingness to attempt to convince another through reasoned persuasion is
what separates negotiation, definitionally, from mere discussion. See Eisenberg, supra
note 1, at 674. See alsoJ. WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 79 ("[Itis axiomatic that opening
positions . . . [in] negotiation.

. . will be some distance apart . . . [and] some method

or procedure is necessary" to close that distance.).
5. Students and lawyers may be wrong, of course, and be influenced by argument
when they do not know it. But even wrong perceptions can mature into values and
shape future practice. See Condlin, The Moral Failure of Clinical Legal Education, in THE
GOOD LAWYER: LAWYERS' ROLES AND LAWYERS' ETHICS 331 n.78 (D. Luban ed. 1983)

(description of theories explaining how perceptions mature into values) [hereinafter
cited as THE GOOD LAWYER]. The perception that argument wastes time is dangerous
because it may breed cynicism about the power of law to influence settlement, discourage full preparation of cases on the merits, and encourage approaches to negotiation
that are incomplete or ineffective. See infra pp. 134-35.
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having to do with the structure of face-to-face bargaining and negotiator understanding of the nature of argument, are advanced.
The results of this analysis have implications for the study of
argument in law school, as well as the further development of the
most prominent theory of the dispute-negotiation process, and raise
normative questions about the role of negotiation argument in producingjust settlements. These theoretical and normative issues are
discussed in preliminary form and questions needing further work
are identified. The Article is principally about argument in negotiation, and not either argument or negotiation generally, or the extent
to which argument, in proportion to other persuasion strategies, influences negotiation outcome, and it is exploratory in every respect.
The discussion is divided into seven sections. Section II defines
argument and describes its various forms in dispute-negotiation.
Section III identifies the essential elements of good argument that
the Article presupposes. Section IV describes the hypothetical dispute-negotiation problem used to produce the Article's data base,
and the legal issues raised by that problem. Section V contains the
data and its analysis. Section VI speculates about causes of the patterns appearing in the argument data, and describes the implications generated by the analysis. Section VII concludes with
suggestions for further study.
II.

ARGUMENT AND NEGOTIATION

Negotiation is a complex phenomenon consisting of several
overlapping and interdependent processes. Each process takes multiple forms and performs multiple functions, which in turn may be
performed by other processes. Argument is an important but small
part of this overall picture, a subprocess of a subprocess, and understanding its role is helped by a description of this context.
A.

Negotiation

Negotiation consists of assessment, persuasion, and exchange.
Combined, these processes account for most of the actions a negotiator takes and most of the stages through which a negotiation proceeds. 6 In assessment a negotiator identifies the principal meaning
6. Many have articulated more elaborate conceptualizations, but most are reducible
to assessment, persuasion and exchange. For examples, see generally S. BACHARACH &
E. LAWLER, BARGAINING: POWER, TACTICS, AND OUTCOME 41-79, 204-13 (1981); 0. BARTOS, PROCESS AND OUTCOME OF NEGOTIATIONS 3-48, 75-100, 169-99, 273-97 (1974); G.
BELLOW & B. MOULTON, THE LAWYERING PROCESS: NEGOTIATION 11-35 (1981); P.H.
GULLIVER, DISPUTES AND NEGOTIATIONS 36-208 (1979); D. PRUrIT, NEGOTIATION BEHANV-
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of an adversary's communication, determines whether it accurately
predicts what the adversary will do, and measures the importance
the adversary attaches to the predicted behavior. 7 Call these the
questions of meaning, trustworthiness, and valuation. Because
these questions are about topics that have strategic importance, answers must be discovered indirectly, on the basis of circumstantial
evidence, and usually as an interpretive by-product of a discussion
about the substance of the dispute.'
Exchange is the process of offer, concession, and, usually agreement. These maneuvers occur in sequence, and collectively are referred to as the concession pattern. Exchange takes place within a
bargaining range, a set of points located on a spectrum of overlap
between the smallest amount one side will accept and the largest
amount the other side will give before refusing to settle. Exchange
is sometimes continuous throughout negotiation and sometimes restricted to certain periods, but all facets of negotiation are directed
IOR 1-17, 46-51 (1981); H. RAIFFA, THE ART AND SCIENCE OF NEGOTIATION 44-65 (1982);
H.L. Ross, SETrLED OUT OF COURT: THE SOCIAL PROCESS OF INSURANCE CLAIMS ADJUSTMENT 136-49 (1970); T. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 21-52 (1960); R. WAL-

TON & R. MCKERSIE, A BEHAVIORAL THEORY OF LABOR NEGOTIATIONS 1-10 (1965); J.
WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 7-10, 42-44, 70-85; 0. YOUNG, BARGAINING: FORMAL THEORIES OF NEGOTIATION 3-19, 25-37, 131-44, 245-52, 303-18 (1975); I. ZARTMAN & M.
BERMAN, THE PRACTICAL NEGOTIATOR 42-199 (1982); Cross, Negotation as a Learning Process, 21 J. CONFLICT RESOLUTION 581 (1977); Mnookin & Kornhauser, Bargaining in the
Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 966-73 (1979); Shea, The Study of
Bargainingand Conflict Behavior: Broadening the Conceptual Arena, 24 J. CONFLICT RESOLUTION 706, 709-32 (1980); G. Bellow, supra note 3, at 26-30.
There is now "no theory of negotiation that can encompass and explain the entire process, [only] a number of well-developed theoretical approaches that both open
the way for and require much more testing and debate." I. ZARTMAN & M. BERMAN,

supra, at 6. See also P.H.

GULLIVER,

supra, at 179-80 (quoting Zartman & Berman and

noting that a determinate theory is not probable in the near future); 0. YOUNG, supra, at
252 (conceding the lack of a "unified theory of bargaining"). Cf 0. BARTOS, supra, at
302-05 (discussing problems with models of negotiation); P.H. GULLIVER, supra, at xvixvii (possibilities of negotiation theory). For a list of the necessary elements of a general
theory of negotiation, see J. RUBIN & B. BROWN, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF BARGAINING AND NEGOTIATION, 299-300 (1975); Druckman, Social Psychological Approaches to the
Study of Negotiation, in NEGOTIATIONS: SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 15-42 (D.
Druckman ed. 1977) [hereinafter cited as NEGOTIATIONS].
7. Thus, when one lawyer says to another, on the day before trial, "You've got to
understand, this client is an old friend of mine, and when he tells me that they've never
had complaints of this kind before, I've got to go with him," the second lawyer must
determine whether the statement is a threat to go to trial; whether friendship for the
client is feigned or real; if real, whether it trumps other (including economic) considerations; and what minimum action would convince the first lawyer not to carry out his

threat.
8. For discussions of assessment, see G. BELLOW & B. MOULTON, supra note 6, at 8393; R. WALTON & R. MCKERSIE, supra note 6, at 61-67; Goffman, Expression Games: An
Analysis of Doubts at Play, in STRATEGIC INTERACTION 1-83 (E. Goffman ed. 1969).
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toward creating conditions for favorable exchange. 9
Persuasion is the process of convincing an adversary to view a
matter in dispute favorably to oneself.'
It can take the form of
threat, appeal, and argument. Threat is the prediction that one will
harm another unless the other performs some specified action
within his control." Appeal is the request that an adversary make a
gratuitous concession and is similar to the practice in animals of going "belly-up" when faced with certain defeat by a more powerful
enemy. 12 Argument is the invocation and reasoned elaboration"' of
authoritative norms-rules, policies, and principles-to support a
negotiation position or to rebut an adversary's position.14
9. For discussions of exchange, see S. BACHARACH & E. LAWLER, supra note 6, at 80103; G. BELLOW & B. MOULTON, supra note 6, at 79-154; P.H. GULLIVER, supra note 6, at
135-53; H. RAIFFA, supra note 6, at 44-65; R. WALTON & R. McKERSIE, supra note 6, at 1357.
10. For discussions of persuasion see Lowenthal, A General Theory of Negotiation Process, Strategy, and Behavior, 31 U. KAN. L. REV. 69, 84-85, 89 (1982); Walcott, Hopmann &
King, The Role of Debate in Negotiation, in NEGOTIATIONS, supra note 6, at 194.
11. Threat occurs, for example, when a lawyer says that he will conduct expensive
discovery unless an adversary agrees to settle at the lawyer's price. The discovery is the
predicted behavior, the agreement to settle is the specified action, and the cost of responding is the harm. Because threat is grounded in power rather than in right, it is
generally disfavored. A person who threatens, when he could appeal or argue, treats
negotiation as a fight or a game rather than as a norm-based system for settling disputes.
This is sometimes a strategically useful message to send, but in the ordinary case, it
provokes more resistance than it dissolves. Cf Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 675 (noting
the cost of using sheer power in rulemaking negotiation). For discussions of threats, see
S. BACHARACH & E. LAWLER, supra note 6, at 104-56; G. BELLOW & E. MOULTON, Supra
note 6, at 130-32; H.L. Ross, supra note 6, at 155-56;J. RUBIN & B. BROWN, supra note 6,
at 278-87; T. SCHELLING, supra note 6, at 35-43, 123-31; R. WALTON & R. MCKERSIE,
supra note 6, at 107-11; 0. YOUNG, supra note 6, at 311-12; Kelly, Experimental Studies of
Threats in InterpersonalNegotiations, 9J. CONFLICT RESOLUTION 79, 101-04 (1965); Lowenthal, supra note 10, at 85-88; Tedeschi & Bonoma, Measures of Last Resort: Coercion and
Aggression in Bargaining,in NEGOTATIONS, supra note 6, at 215-36.
12. Typically in an appeal, a lawyer says, "I don't want to go home empty-handed.
Could you let me have such-and-such?" and means just that. In addition to asking for a
favor, appeal consists of throwing oneself on the mercy of an opponent, in order to use
offensively an opponent's hesitancy to exploit vulnerability. See generally S. BACHARACH &
E. LAWLER, supra note 6, at 175-77 (discussion of "appeals" to "responsibility" norm).
For a description of going "belly-up," see K. LORENZ, ON AGGRESSION 122 (1963).
13. "Reasoned elaboration is that 'area of rational discourse ...
where men seek to
trace out and articulate the implications of shared purposes . . . [that] serve as "premises" or starting points.' " Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 669 (quoting L. Fuller, The Forms
and Limits of Adjudication 269 (1959) (unpublished paper available in Harvard Law
School Library)). In dispute-negotiation, reasoned elaboration takes "as its starting
point norms of general applicability derived from sources outside the immediate dispute," or for present concerns, derived from the positive law. Id.
14. See generally S. BACHARACH & E. LAWLER, supra note 6, at 157 ("Arguments are the
justifications. . . that parties give for the positions they take in bargaining."); Heymann,
The Problems of Coordination: Bargaining and Rules, 86 HARV. L. REV. 797, 859-70 (1973)
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Each of these distinctions is often problematic. For example,
explicit argument usually contains implicit threat (e.g., if the argument is lost, prohibitive costs will be imposed); explicit threat usually contains implicit argument (e.g., that the threat will be carried
out); and explicit appeal usually contains both (e.g., that one ought
not to exploit vulnerability, and if one does, one will pay for it in the
future). Similarly, assessment, persuasion and exchange intertwine
in each action that a negotiator takes. A threat to take a case to trial
is also a prod to produce data for assessment, a tactic to camouflage
the fact that assessment is taking place, an argument that the listener ought to be economically rational, a principled corroboration
of the party's commitment to an offer then on the table, and so on.
The processes are also intercontingent. Assessment tells a negotiator which persuasion and exchange techniques work, persuasion
creates doubts that make it easier to provoke concessions, and exchange puts concessions in binding form so that continued assessment and argument are unnecessary.' 5
(argument as a method of achieving coordination); Lowenthal, supra note 10, at 84-85,
89 (discussing role of argument in negotiation). While common among novice negotiators, explicit argument is less prominent in negotiations between experienced lawyers
who bargain with one another regularly (e.g., personal injury plaintiffs' lawyers and insurance company counsel, prosecutors and criminal defense lawyers). Perhaps this is
because personal familiarity and common experiences give lawyers shared views about
what law is settled and what evidence counts as persuasive, and enable them to play out
arguments privately in their heads so that they need discuss only novel or controversial
points openly. See, e.g., H.L. Ross, supra note 6, at 153-54 (negotiation between lawyer
and insurance adjuster). Bellow found that such tacit bargaining produced "collusive"
and "highly routinized, patterned and predictable" settlements that were "determined
to a significant degree by the values, attitudes and needs of the lawyers rather than the
clients." G. Bellow, supra note 3, at 33-35. Power in negotiation is found in more than
just arguments, threats, and appeals. See generally S. BACHARACH & E. LAWLER, supra note
6, at 41-79 (discussion of sources of power); see also P.H. GULLIVER, supra note 6, at xviiixix ("[P]ower . . . reside[s] in material resources and normative claims .... "); id. at
186-90 ("In sum, there appears to be considerable ambiguity and great operational difficulty in using the concept of power to explain . . . convergence on an agreed outcome."); id. at 200-07 ("negotiating power: an operational scheme"); T. SCHELLING,
supra note 6, at 22-28 (discussion of power in negotiation as "power to bind oneself");
R. WALTON & R. McKERSIE, supra note 6, at 185-209 (discussion of power and the
dimensions of the labor negotiating relationship).
15. Though argument may be manifest in any negotiation process, including assessment and exchange, and may be used to accomplish such non-persuasion objectives as
filling time, catharsis or posturing for a client, this Article will be concerned with the
explicit use of argument to convince an adversary of the strength of one's position based
upon either correct understandings of substantive law or correct predictions of what a
court will do. The analysis will be limited to assessing an argument's verbal content.
Tone, pace, attitude, demeanor and a full range of complex nonverbal signals add significantly to the content of what an argument communicates, but those qualities are difficult to capture on paper, and the reader is rarely in a good enough position to
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B.

Argument

Argument may be expressed in a moral, rule, or strategic
form. 6 In its moral form, it says that something should be done
because it is right to do it, judged by consensus standards of what is
good, fair, and just. The argument that one should not misrepresent the quality of merchandise to an illiterate consumer because
misrepresentation does not respect the consumer's autonomy as a
person, is an example of an argument in moral form. The rule form
of the same argument is the utilitarian claim that valid laws (e.g.,
those against misrepresentation) should be obeyed or horrible consequences will result (e.g., everyone will ignore the law when it suits
his purpose). The strategic form makes the prediction that a court
will find the misrepresentation legally culpable, and will impose a
penalty on its maker. These forms of argument often combine in
practice and the choice of one is usually a choice of emphasis rather
than kind.
Argument's purpose, as has been said, is to convince an adversary to see the issues in dispute in terms favorable to oneself. But
"convincing" someone in the highly stylized, rapid-fire, and often
dance-like conversation of negotiation has special meaning. Negotiators do not usually reach public agreement, either about what the
law requires in an objective sense, or about how a court will apply it.
Explicit concession of even minor substantive points rarely occurs.
Privately, however, the parties are more tentative in their respective
commitments, and when an adversary raises an unanticipated argument, with an unexpected facility or conviction, new doubts arise
about pre-negotiation beliefs. Usually this happens tacitly. A negotiator does not say to himself, "I feel my resolve weakening;" it simply occurs. In fact, there is little rational alternative. A belief in
what law requires is always tentative, in the sense that it must be
reworked each time a new piece of data relevant to forming the
belief is discovered. Doubt is not the same as loss of conviction and
new points ultimately may be rejected as insubstantial, or assimilated as compatible with one's position, but until this happens, new
determine if the analysis is correct. While a significant amount of meaning may be lost
by focusing on words, that still seems the appropriate place to begin.
16. For other typologies making similar distinctions, see S. BACHARACH & E. LAWLER,
supra note 6, at 168-78; G. BELLOW & B. MOULTON, THE LAWYERING PROCESS: MATERIALS
FOR CLINICAL INSTRUCTION IN ADVOCACY 852-53, 883-84 (1978); G. BELLOW & B.
MOULTON, supra note 6, at 142-46;J. RUBIN & B. BROWN, Supra note 6, at 261-62. Compare the discussion of "argumentative structures" in C. PERELMAN & L. OBRECHTSTYTECA, THE NEW RHETORIC: A TREATISE ON ARGUMENTATION 9, 194 (1969); with that
in Bobbit, Constitutional Fate, 58 TEX. L. REV. 695, 698-750 (1980).
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points give one reason to pause and doubt.' 7
Some argument is successful because it is undeniably true, but
most produces doubt that is not removable within the time frame of
the negotiation. A negotiator may not agree with an argument, may
even believe that it is wrong, but unless he can explain how the argument fails, he will feel compelled to defer to it in some significant
way. A losing negotiator is rarely convinced that he was wrong;
more often his beliefs and level of conviction are weakened at the
margin, and as a result, he concedes a little more than he had
planned.18
C.

Cooperation and Competition

Like approaches to negotiation generally, argument may be categorized as cooperative or competitive.' 9 Cooperative argument
consists of non-coercive, rational analysis, in which the objective is
to teach another about the truth of one's substantive claims. This
effort stops when the listener understands, or when the claims have
17. This is more of a logical than empirical claim. The assumptions are that doubt
under conditions of new data is an inescapable element of rational behavior, and that
negotiation behavior is rational. See P.H. GULLIVER, supra note 6, at 191. This is a cognitive-dissonance based view. For a discussion of the theory of cognitive dissonance, see
L.

FESTINGER,

A

THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE

1-4 (1976).

18. This process can be substantive as well as strategic. Doubts can develop either
from the negotiator's incomplete or mistaken understanding or from his being too easily
impressed or intimidated. After the fact, a negotiator rarely recognizes what has happened. He explains unplanned concessions by saying that he had no alternative, that he
got all that was possible, that his pre-negotiation estimate was overly optimistic; and he
attributes a less favorable outcome to facts beyond his control: the other side's case was
stronger than he anticipated, or, it would have cost him too much to move the adversary
from his irrationally intransigent position. No doubt such analyses are sometimes true,
but the fact that they are automatically made, and obviously self-serving, gives one reason to pause. See P.H. GULLIVER, supra note 6, at 168.
This is not the only way that argument takes effect in negotiation. In fact there is
no "model of persuasive communication that provides a general explanation for . . .
successes and failures . . . in changing attitudes and behaviors." K. REARDON, PERSUASION: THEORY AND CONTExT 61 (1981). For a description of ten competing theoretical
formulations, see id. at 62-111. No more is claimed than that the "rational-doubt" phenomenon is common, and happens even to intelligent negotiators. In fact, it is an experience to which intelligent negotiators may be disproportionately prone.
19. For a synopsis of the literature on cooperative and competitive approaches to
negotiation, see Lowenthal, supra note 10, at 72-75. The cooperative-competitive dichotomy is fundamental to most social science research about negotiation. For additional approaches using this dichotomy, see S. BACHARACH & E. LAWLER, supra note 6, at
162-64; 0. BARTOS, supra note 6, at 171-99; D. PRUITr, supra note 6, 71-136;J. RUBIN &
B. BROWN, supra note 6, at 158-94, 198-213; R. WALTON & R. McKERSIE, supra note 6, at
11-183 (using synonyms of "distributive" and "integrative"); J. WILLIAMS, supra note 1,
at 20-40, 47-54; Druckman, supra note 6, at 26-28; Schlenker & Goldman, Cooperatorsand
Competitors in Conflict: A Test of the Triangle Model, 22J. CONFLICT RESOLUTION 393 (1978).
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been shown to be false. Cooperative argument raises all relevant
issues, takes favorable and unfavorable evidence into account, and is
expressed at a pace and manner that make digesting and rebutting
easy. It does not rely for its force on factors such as power, stamina,
tolerance for conflict, delay, ignorance, status, and the like. In cooperative argument, the image of the adversary is that of an autonomous, rational actor, willing to learn.2 0
Competitive argument consists of rhetorical and psychological
maneuvering designed to coerce an adversary, sometimes subtly
and sometimes not, into deferring to one's view when, if fully informed, he would not or should not.2 ' The objective is manipulation, not understanding. Efforts to persuade stop when the
adversary agrees to do as one wishes (e.g., sign a settlement document embodying one's terms and not oppose it when presented to
22
the court), even if he does not fully understand what he is doing.
Competitive argument is based on favorable evidence, and
presented in a manner aimed at minimizing critical inspection (e.g.,
20. For a discussion of this process as "fair argument," see Condlin, Socrates' New
Clothes: Substituting Persuasionfor Learning in Clinical PracticeInstruction, 40 MD. L. REV. 223,

237 n.33 (1981). See also Condlin, supra note 5, at 326. Compare to cooperative argument the technique of "bilateral focus" suggested by Anatol Rapoport. A. RAPOPORT,
STRATEGY AND CONSCIENCE 176 (1964). See also G. BELLOW & E. MOULTON, supra note 6,
at 150-57; R. WALTON & R. McKERsIE, supra note 6, at 145-61;J. WILLIAMS, supra note 1,
at 53-54.
21. In the language of communication research, competitive argument seeks behavioral modification and realignment, not attitude change. See Miller, Foreword, in K. REARDON, supra note 18, at 9.

22. For an illustration of how a person could fear being induced to act against himself "purely through the use of argument," see the incident involving Bill Veeck and
Branch Rickey described in Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 667 n.87. The tale of Brer Rabbit
is another such example. See G. BELLOW & E. MOULTON, supra note 6, at 9-10. Contract
law anticipates the possibility of action against one's interests and provides protection
against some such activity. See generally Eisenberg, The Bargain Principle and Its Limits, 95
HARV. L. REV. 741 (1982); Kronman, Paternalismand the Law of Contracts, 92 YALE L.J. 763

(1983). For a description of circumstances in which competitive approaches may succeed, see Tedeschi & Bonoma, supra note 11, at 213. For further discussions of competitive approaches, see generally S. BACHARACH & E. LAWLER, supra note 6, at 167 ("[Olne
focus of. . . argumentation is the cognitive manipulation of each other's bargaining
power."); P.H. GULLIVER, supra note 6, at 192 ("[I]t is likely that in the process of demonstrating alleged congruence between norms and demand, there will be. . . some manipulation of the norms."); R. WALTON & R. McKERSIE, supra note 6, at 67-82
(discussion of manipulating opponent's perception of his own and adversary's utilities);
J. WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 48-52 (discussion of "the competitive strategy"); 0. YOUNG,
supra note 6, at 303-07 ("[I]t is the combination of opportunities for communication
with the presence of strategic interaction which paves the way for the manipulative activities that constitute the core of bargaining."); Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 6, at
972-73 (description of the conditions that create the opportunity for competitive behavior in divorce negotiation).
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rapidly, authoritatively) and exploiting fear, insecurity, anger, affection, and the like. Here, the adversary is seen as an obstacle to be
removed or circumvented; a type rather than a person, whose motives are antagonistic, and whose actions are purely strategic. 23 Cooperative and competitive qualities can be substantive and manifest
in the content of a negotiator's views; or stylistic, and manifest in
the demeanor and tone used to express substantive views, and this
distinction is often an important one to make. 4 The competitivecooperative categories are ideal types, and particular arguments will
have attributes from each.
Cooperative argument is obviously useful in dispute-negotiation, but competitive argument must have more said for it. Several
characteristics of dispute-negotiation limit the extent to which full
cooperation is possible. For example, in most disputes some issues
may be zero-sum, 25 in that each party will value the stakes in the
same way, and one party's gain will be the other's loss. When such
situations occur, what is needed is not clearer understanding of
one's interests, but accommodation and compromise. A characteristic response to zero-sum issues is selfishness. For a wide variety of
reasons, many legitimate, parties often will want as much as they can
get,2 6 and instruct their lawyers to act in this way. When a lawyer
23. These definitions of cooperation and competition are less rigorous than those
typically used in the social science or philosophical literature. See, e.g., R. AXELROD, THE
EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION

6-7 (1984); D.

REGAN, UTILITARIANISM AND CO-OPERATION

126-34 (1980). This is because I have used the terms to isolate important differences in
the two most common pure approaches to legal argument, not to distinguish between
competitive and cooperative behavior generally or even between competitive and cooperative bargaining.
24. The distinction is the missing element in Williams' analysis of competitive and
cooperative negotiation styles. See generallyJ. WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 19-40. Several
seeming anomalies-e.g., that competitive and cooperative negotiators are often equally
successful, but other times, not-could be accounted for in part by this distinction.
25. See, e.g., Morgenstern, Game Theory, in 6 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE

SOCIAL SCIENCES 62, 63 (D. Sills ed. 1968). This characterization usually pertains only
to outcomes, and excludes both transaction costs and indirect benefits derived from
engaging in negotiation or from conferring a benefit on another. On transaction costs,
see generally Demsetz, The Costs of Transacting, 82 QJ. OF ECON. 33 (1968).
26. A party might have the best legal or moral claim to the stakes, or sincerely believe that he does, and be entitled to act that way until shown that he is wrong. Or, his
legal and moral rights may depend on what the other party is willing to give, and since
the best evidence of what another will give is often what he actually concedes in response to the most pressure that can be put on him, a party would be entitled to press
for as much as he can. There is empirical support for the closely related proposition
that "[i]n the absence of information about the other's subjective utilities, bargainers are
most likely to reach an optimal agreement if they each focus on the clear and honest
presentation of their own needs and preferences and avoid trying to 'get inside the head'
of the other." J. RUBIN & B. BROWN, supra note 6, at 271. See also D. PRUrIT, supra note 6,
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enters a negotiation, therefore, one possible condition is that the
adverse negotiator, or his principal, will have a competing conception of the good. It is also possible that he will not, but a lawyer will
not know which is the case in advance.
With this possibility as a backdrop, negotiators are likely to approach one another circumspectly, revealing as little as possible until discovering what state of affairs obtains. This is only prudent.
One does not expose one's neck until it is clear that the head will
not be chopped off. (This is not to suggest that one never takes
risks.) As long as the negotiators are strangers, that is, as long as
each cannot predict with certainty how the other will resolve the dispute (a condition of almost all negotiation, even between repeat
players), cautiousness and circumspection will seem the wisest
course for each.
When negotiators talk guardedly, however, they increase their
mutual suspicion, because they look as if they do not trust one another, which, of course, to some extent they do not. This suspicion,
in turn, encourages each to interpret the other's behavior in competitive terms. 7 In the process, a vicious cycle is set up that can be
broken only by one of the negotiators making himself disproportionately vulnerable. For understandable reasons, this happens infrequently. Each negotiator thinks of his actions as necessary for
self-protection, and only rarely has enough perspective on the process to understand how they contribute to the suspicion and antago28
nism that develops.
The truncated time limits within which negotiation occurs make
it difficult, even for reasonable and fair-minded negotiators, to overcome this cycle of selfishness, suspicion, and self-fulfilling prediction. Add to this the prevailing definition of lawyer role (principally
that of a zealous advocate) which encourages satisfaction of client
selfishness, 29 a legal rule structure which can be manipulated in
at 191-92 (noting that in "[p]roductive conflicts ...
parties state their preferences and
stick to their goals"); H. RAIFFA, supra note 6, at 348 (describing results of a "social
dilemma game"); cf. Heymann, supra note 14, at 821-23 (discussion of "the problem of
trust" in coordinating activity).
27. Cf Condlin, supra note 20, at 228-35, 238-42 (description of this interpretive
process); Condlin, supra note 5, at 328-29.
28. It is not unusual for law trained people to have habits that seal them off from a
critical understanding of their own communication practices. See Condlin, supra note 20,
at 242 n.48. Cf C. ARGYRIS & D. SCHON, THEORY IN PRACTICE 26-27, 76-79 (1974) (discussion of "self-sealing" theories).
29. The obligation to represent a client zealously is found in Canon 7-101 of the
American Bar Association's MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1979) and
in Rules 1.2 & 1.3 of its MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1983) (now stated as
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multiple ways, a commonly accepted sense of lawyer craft as the
skillful manipulation of this rule structure, competitive lawyer habits
developed by law school training in "adversarial skills," ' the implicit obligation to converse continuously, at a fast pace, without the
chance to mull over ideas or make costless false starts, and the fact
that negotiation takes place in private, outside the purview of any
monitoring agent, and one can understand how negotiators often
will see competitive argument as the most reasonable means for
protecting all of the interests at stake."' If negotiators are not stylis"diligently"). The nature and extent of this obligation has always been a matter of debate. See B. Shaw, A Survey of Legal Ethics in the Nineteenth Century 24-33 (1980)
(unpublished paper submitted in the Seminar on Advanced Professional Responsibility
at Harvard Law School, on file with author). Recently, however, the debate has taken on
added life. There is still general agreement that a lawyer must be zealous, but there is
substantial difference of opinion about whether zealousness requires doing whatever the
client requests. For discussion of the issue, see generally A. GOLDMAN, THE MORAL
FOUNDATIONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS (1980); THE GOOD LAWYER, supra note 5; Carrington, The Right to Zealous Counsel, 1979 DUKE L.J. 1291; Frankel, The Search for Truth:
An Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1030 (1975); Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: the Moral
Foundations of the Lawyer-Client Relation, 85 YALE LJ. 1060 (1975); Luban, The Sources of
Legal Ethics: A German-American Comparison, 48 RABELS ZEITSCHRIFT FUR AUSLANDISCHES
UND INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT 245 (1984); Postema, Moral Responsibility in Profes-

sional Ethics, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 63 (1980); Schwartz, The ProfessionalismandAccountability of
Lawyers, 66 CALIF. L. REV. 669 (1978); Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy: ProceduralJustice
and Professional Ethics, 1978 Wis. L. REV. 29; Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Professionals: Some
Moral Problems, 5 HUM. RTS. 1 (1975).
30. For a description of these skills and the habits that such training can develop, see
Condlin, supra note 20, at 273-74; Condlin, supra note 5, at 326-32.
31. But see R. AXELROD, supra note 23. This important recent book suggests that belief in competitive argument may be strategically irrational. Using data collected from a
prisoner's dilemma game tournament, Axelrod concludes that when the future casts "a
sufficiently large shadow" the perfectly reciprocal cooperative strategy of tit-for-tat is
the only strategy that maximizes individual gain and is collectively stable (i.e., is able to
resist the challenge of all possible mutant strategies over time). Id. at 174. (For a
refreshingly clear, if not fully rigorous, discussion of the logic of this conclusion using
the theory of metagames, see S. BRAMS, GAME THEORY AND POLITICS 34-38 (1975).)

Giv-

ing practical advice to bargainers based on his conclusions, Axelrod suggests: 1) do not
be envious (i.e., ask how well you are doing compared to how well someone else could
do in your shoes, not compared to the other bargainer); 2) do not be the first to defect
(i.e., always cooperate on your first move: be "nice" in Axelrod's terminology); 3) reciprocate both cooperation and defection (i.e., be provocable but not vengeful); and 4) do
not be too clever (i.e., do not make your approach so complicated as to be incomprehensible, and thus arouse suspicion). R. AXELROD, supra note 23, at 107-23.
Axelrod's conclusions are carefully drawn, his experiment is clever, his analysis is
insightful, and the implications of his work for lawyer bargaining are likely to be considerable. But legal dispute-bargaining is sufficiently different from the pure prisoner's
dilemma to caution against too quick and facile an extrapolation. (In fairness, Axelrod
does not suggest such an extrapolation, but others are likely to.) Like game theorists,
Axelrod assumes that a player can always know when his counterpart has made a competitive or cooperative move, and in the simplified decision matrix of the prisoner's dilemma game this is quite reasonable. But in legal bargaining this judgment is not always
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tically rude, belligerent or overbearing in their discussions, they will
so easy to make. For example, if by the use of "power language," I convince you that
you should cooperate with me because your interests are the same as mine when they
are not, I would have competed successfully against you by appearing to cooperate.
(For discussions of"power language," see Erickson, Lind, Johnson & O'Barr, Speech Style
and Impression Formationin a Court Setting: The Effects of "Power"and "Powerless"Speech, 14J.
or EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 266 (1978); Lakoff, Language and Woman's Place, 2
LANGUAGE IN Soc'Y 45 (1973).) If my deception is small and my skill at concealing it
great, I might be able to maintain this strategy over the lifetime of our relationship,
particularly if our interactions are not as continuous as those of a prisoner's dilemma
game, and your awareness or memory of my strategy is not vivid each new time we meet.
To the extent that the situation I have described is no longer a true prisoner's dilemma,
the prisoner's dilemma does not embody important features of lawyer dispute-settlement. See generally S. BRAMS, supra, at 30-31 (description of conditions of a prisoner's
dilemma).
Likewise, the future does not cast the same length shadow in all kinds of lawyer
relationships, and arguments for cooperation in negotiation must take these differences
into account. Perhaps I should cooperate with another lawyer I do not expect to bargain
with again soon, but Axelrod's analysis does not provide any basis for this claim. It may
also be that the general category of cooperation needs further elaboration. Withholding
privately held evidentiary data may not produce the same reaction as withholding information about case law and each in turn may not produce the same response as keeping
one's bargaining posture private. These differences, if they exist, pose no problem for
Axelrod, since specifying the content of the category of cooperative behavior is all that is
involved, but they would be of crucial importance to lawyer negotiators who would discover that cooperation in the technical sense did not always equate with ordinary cooperation.
Two additional features of Axelrod's analysis bear comment. First, the work
adds fuel to the debate between those who would ground morality in consequentialist
considerations on the one hand, and those who would use the nature of the individual,
intellectualized ideals, or transcendental doctrines on the other. If a social obligation to
cooperate can be fully established on the basis of results from a prisoner's dilemma
game and conceptions of self-interest and ordinary rationality, what need is there of
more Kantian or perfectionist arguments? Axelrod does not make such a claim, but he
gives a big empirical boost to those who do. See, e.g., D. PARFIT, REASONS & PERSONS
(1984); Regan, supra note 23, at 125-42; 207-211; E. ULLMANN-MARGALIT, THE EMERGENCE OF NORMS 41-44 (1977); Gauthier, Morality and Advantage, 76 PHIL. REV. 460-75
(1967).
Second, Axelrod creates an interesting new dilemma for practicing lawyers bent
on following the advice to negotiate more cooperatively. See infra note 34. Axelrod
shows that tit-for-tat is the obvious choice among cooperative strategies. It maximizes
individual gain and eventually drives other strategies, both competitive and cooperative,
out of the bargaining universe. Since tit-for-tat is a strategy for maximizing gain over
the long run, however, rather than in any particular case (in fact, it cannot win any single
encounter outright, by definition), how does a lawyer justify its use to a client who says,
"I don't care about the future, I want you to get as much as you can for me, in this case,
now!" What if the client also refers the lawyer to MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-105 (1979) or the MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7
(1983), and the body of case law construing the concept of "conflict of interest," arguing
that a tit-for-tat strategy amounts to the impermissible trade-off of the interests of future
clients for those of present ones. In short, it may be that lawyers cannot cooperate in
the manner game theory shows to be the most efficient and still adhere to the espoused
ethical norms of the legal profession. And since these norms are grounded in considera-

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL.

44:65

often uncover areas in which they agree. But even this outcome will
be a product of a conversation that is in large measure competitive
in that it consists of advancing one's own position, rebutting the adversary's, and withholding private information.
This analysis holds even for negotiators who strive honestly to
reach settlements that are legal and moral. This is because definitions of legality and morality reasonably can differ. Occasionally,
underlying norms will be the same for both sides, but one side tries
more scrupulously or skillfully to adhere to them. But most differences are explained by the fact that there are no unanimously
shared conceptions of legality and morality. Reasoning logically
from different yet defensible starting points, scrupulously legal and
moral negotiators can pursue a wide array of justifiable outcomes.3 2
While for each individual there may be only one result consistent
with the individual's legal and moral beliefs, the number of such
reasonable beliefs is more numerous than one. Thus, even in bargaining for settlements that are moral and legal there can be a winner and a loser, depending upon whose conception of morality and
legality prevails. When winning or losing are possible, competitive
argument is rarely absent. 33 One can acknowledge as legitimate,
tions other than efficiency or maximization in the long run, one side of the equation
might have to give way. Put another way, there may be a conflict between some of the
profession's formal norms, (e.g., those having to do with conflict of interest), and informal norms embodied in lawyer practices used to maintain the smooth operation of the
institutions of law practice. Cf Luban, Calming the Hearse Horse: A PhilosophicalResearch
Programfor Legal Ethics, 40 MD. L. REV. 451, 460-62 (1981) (discussion of distinction
between moral and practical norms in the legal profession).
32. For example, a philosophical system that focuses on acts (Kantianism) or states
of affairs (utilitarianism) will resolve particular problems differently from a system that
focuses on the character of the agent (Aristotelianism). Yet each resolution would be
justified within the terms of its respective system.
33. See generally Mindes & Acock, Trickster, Hero, Helper: A Report on the Lawyer Image,
1982 AM. B. FOUND. RESEARCH J. 177, 220-29 (discussion of cultural, social and professional pressures on lawyers to be competitive). For a quasi-moral justification of competitive behavior, see Brown & Dauer, Professional Responsibility in Nonadversarial
Lawyering: A Review of the Model Rules, 1982 AM. B. FOUND. RESEARCH J. 519, 527-28.
It is difficult to resolve the questions of how and when competitive argument is
justified in moral and political terms. Is competitive argument-like killing in self-defense or fighting in a just war-acceptable when legitimate ends outweigh questionable
means? See generally PUBLIC AND PRIVATE MORALITY (S. Hampshire ed. 1978). Or is such
argument necessary to the effective functioning of a dispute resolution system that, as a
system, produces sufficient public or social good to excuse the bad acts of individual
negotiators who operate the system? See generally Luban, The Adversary System Excuse, in
THE GOOD LAWYER, supra note 5, at 83 (discussing systemic excuses for the adversarial
system). If either is true, it is still not altogether clear what consequences for lawyers,
and for the legal system as a whole, flow from the practice of "killing in self-defense"
several times a day.
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therefore, the call for more cooperation, disclosure, and evenhandedness in dispute-negotiation, without denying the occasional
appropriateness and more frequent inevitability of competitive argument as well. 4
34. The call for increased cooperation is associated principally with Roger Fisher
and William Ury, and their recently popular book, GETrING TO YES (1981). For another
expression of the "cooperation" view, see Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View of Negotiation: The Structure of Legal Problem Solving, 31 UCLA L. REV. 754 (1984). Fisher and Ury
imply that most bargaining involves the resolution of "cognitive conflict:" that in which
the actual interests of parties coincide, notwithstanding their seemingly antagonistic positions. R. FISHER & W. URY, supra, at 43-45. (The term "cognitive conflict" comes from
Thibaut & Walker, A Theory of Procedure, 66 CALIF. L. REV. 541, 543 (1978).) In their
view, bargaining is amenable to "objective" and "principled" resolution "on the merits," in which bargainers deduce resolutions to particular disputes from consensus metanorms. R. FISHER & W. URY, supra, at 84-91. Bargaining is analytical problem-solving
more than accommodation and compromise.
Fisher and Ury's claim that dispute-negotiation is amenable to "objective resolution" is frequently wrong. Not all values or belief structures are commensurable in
terms of each other or some common denominator. On some issues there are competing conceptions of the good and discussion of those issues in terms of the parties' underlying interests, rather than overt postures, will not change this fact. See generally S.
BACHARACH & E. LAWLER, supra note 6, at 165-66 (discussing this problem in terms of
"qualitative" vs. "quantitative" issues); 0. BARTOS, supra note 6, at 14-16 (negotiation
terminates only overt social conflict behavior, not the underlying conflicts of interest of
the negotiating parties); R. WALTON & R. McKERSIE, supra note 6, at 17-19 (discussion of
"dissimilarity between the value systems of the two parties"); M. WALZER, SPHERES OF
JUSTICE 79 (1983); J. WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 62-66 (description of differing conceptions of justice); Sagoff, Economic Theory and Environmental Law, 79 MICH. L. REV. 1393,
1402-18 (1981) (discussion of the "category mistake" in disregarding incommensurability of many values, using environmental disputes as examples). (Differences about conceptions of the good are also at the core of the "rights" debate referred to infra note 39.)
The popularity of the idea that conflict is usually grounded in misunderstanding may be
traced to Anatol Rapoport. See generally A. RAPOPORT, FIGHTS, GAMES AND DEBATES
(1960); A. RAPOPORT, supra note 20. Rapoport's analysis was largely speculative, and
experimental findings over the years have done little to confirm it. See, e.g., Walcott,
Hopmann & King, supra note 10, at 199.
Recently Fisher has repudiated some of the more obvious weaknesses in this
view, in part through a resuscitation of the doctrine of intelligible essences. See Fisher,
Essay Review, The Pros and Cons of Getting to Yes, 34J. LEGAL EDUC. 120, 122-24 (1984). But
see R. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS 31-32 ("there are no intelligible essences").
But he continues to insist that distributional issues are best settled by cooperative bargaining. While Fisher never says explicitly that a cooperative approach will always or
usually fare better, he implies it, and his notoriety depends upon that reading of his view.
The cooperative approach is superior, Fisher contends, because both parties have a
shared and, implicitly, overriding "interest in identifying quickly and amicably a result
acceptable to each, if one is possible." Id. at 121. But surely this will be true only some
of the time. For example, Fisher describes two men in a lifeboat quarreling over limited
rations. A insists that he will sink the boat unless he gets 60% of the rations, and B
insists that he will sink the boat unless he gets 80%. Fisher suggests that their problem
ought to be thought of as the common one of "how to divide the rations without tipping
over the boat, while getting the boat to safe waters," and that the negotiator who approaches the problem in this way will fare better. Id. But surely this depends upon such
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D. Argument in Negotiation
Argument of all types is central to dispute-negotiation in at
least two ways. First, in an instrumental sense, it is nearly a logical
precondition to a negotiated agreement. A settlement is attractive
or not primarily in comparison with alternative dispositions. In dispute-negotiation the principal alternative is a decision by a court. In
settling, each side compares a proposed agreement against its prediction of what a court will do, minus the transaction costs of having
a court do that. Since a court will apply the law, the parties must be
able to predict that application; to do this, they must understand the
legal issues from the perspective of both sides. Because they cannot
talk frankly and unguardedly with one another, argument is the vehicle best adapted to this task.3 5
factors as whether A, B or both can swim, the proximity of land, the availability of help,
and the like. If A could swim and B could not, and land was within sight, B might be
advised to take A's threat seriously, especially in dangerous waters, and give him 60% of
the rations. And if there was no continuing relationship, so that B could not pay A back,
A would forever be out the value of some portion of the rations (probably 10% if they
would split the rations in half if neither side had superior leverage) if he followed
Fisher's advice. There are other considerations that might cause A not to approach the
ration-distribution problem in this way. (For example, there can be nonstrategic, normative reasons for bargaining cooperatively, but these would control behavior only
when both parties subscribed to the normative scheme, and, as the text describes, it is
often difficult for negotiators to know when this is so. Fisher argues that cooperation is
generally good strategy, however, not just good morality, and this is what he has yet to
establish.) But positing an overriding joint interest with B in not sinking the boat begs
the question. Fisher could add features to the hypothetical that would support his claim,
but in so doing he would establish that his view holds only when those added features
are present. This would undercut his claim to have developed a generally applicable
approach. Joint interests sometimes may override individual interests, e.g., when one
side has no, or only a slight, strategic advantage-but even the judgment of when this is
so is typically made from a competitive rather than cooperative perspective. Only when
A's and B's positions are perfectly interchangeable will Fisher's analysis be true, and this
condition is not likely to occur much of the time. I have responded to what I take to be
the spirit of Fisher's lifeboat example, (i.e., that disputes ought to be resolved according
to mutually advantageous and nonresentment producing principles) rather than to his
literal words (i.e., that bargainers ought to reach results "acceptable to each") (emphasis
added). One-sided and competitive negotiation can produce results that are "acceptable" in the sense that one bargainer likes them and the other can live with them (i.e. they
are the lesser of all evils), but I take it that this type of settlement is not what Fisher has
in mind.
A more sophisticated conceptual framework, such as Raiffa's idea of "cooperative antagonism" fully developed or Regan's theory of "cooperative utilitarianism," is
needed to analyze the relationship between cooperation and competition in disputenegotiation. See Raiffa, supra note 6, at 18; Regan, supra note 23, at 135-42; 207-11.
35. It is hard to know unilaterally what a court will do. See, e.g., Mnookin and Kornhauser, supra note 6, at 969-71. Awareness of where one would like the court to come
out distorts one's perspective and makes objective prediction difficult. Preparatory research done from this perspective gives unwarranted salience to arguments for (rather
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The second reason for argument's importance is that, as the
embodiment of the parties' legal claims, it is one of the aspects of
negotiation most directly responsible for the justice of a negotiated
agreement.3 6 When they use the legal system, parties are entitled to
than against) one's position, and makes the conclusions of that research less trustworthy. And important factual data necessary to making the prediction are often within the
control of the adverse party and thus unknown. Because the possibility of unrealistic
prediction is high and known to be so, a negotiator is almost compelled to argue law.
36. The assumption here is that dispute-negotiation is a normative as well as a strategic process. Negotiators subscribe to background norms that make up the positive law
and formulate their notions of good and bad legal argument in terms of accepted canons
of interpreting these norms. Cf P.H. GULLIVER, supra note 6, at 190-94 ("[T]he dispute
begins in terms of norms, whatever else may be involved . . . . That is to say, the

dispute itself. . . is defined in part by a normative framework that both parties more or
less accept in the situation."); Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 650-51 ("[I]nternalization of
moral standards and the pressure of peer-group and public opinion contribute to the
force of principles and rules in negotiation."); id. at 639 ("[I]n most cases of disputenegotiation the outcome is heavily determined by the principles, rules and precedents
that the parties invoke."); Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 6, at 968 (Parties "bargain
in the shadow of the law . . . . [T]he outcome that the law will impose . . . gives each
[bargainer] . . . an endowment of sorts."); id. at 977-80 (description of the ways in
which different substantive norms "give various amounts of bargaining chips to the parties"). In this respect, dispute-negotiation is a hybrid of bargaining and adjudication,
and thus unlike the bargaining dominated subjects of the rich social science literature on
negotiation. See, e.g., Druckman, supra note 6, at 24. For a description of the continuities
and dissimilarities between adjudication and dispute-negotiation, see P.H. GULLIVER,
supra note 6, at 3-24; H.L. Ross, supra note 6, at 137-42; Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 64445, 649-65. Perhaps for this reason, this literature has comparatively little to say about
the nature and effect of argument in influencing negotiation outcome. For summaries of
the limited experimental studies about argument, see Walcott, Hopmann & King, supra
note 10, at 194-203, 208-09. Game-theoretic and most economic models commonly
assume argument away. See generally S. BACHARACH & E. LAWLER, supra note 6, at 6-25
(game-theory-particularly that of John Nash and John Hicks); id. at 26-36 (economic
theory-particularly that of Frederick Zeuthen and Jan Pen); P.H. GULLIVER, supra note
6, at 190 (economic theory);J. WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 68 (economic and game-theoretic models); 0. YOUNG, supra note 6, at 135-36; 138-41 (same); id. at 136-37 (economic
theory that allows for strategic and manipulative interaction); id. at 23-36 (game theory).
Some social psychological models provide for argument. See, e.g., J. RUBIN & B. BROWN,
supra note 6, at 261-62. But applications of this model focus almost exclusively on
threat, promise and appeal. See, e.g., id. at 278-88 (discussing only appeals, demands,
promises, and threats); T. SCHELLING, supra note 6, at 33-46 (discussing only threat,
promise, and commitment);J. WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 79-81 (section on "argumentation," which discusses only concession making).
Even the best of these writers usually treat bargaining as a series of strategic
moves that are made over time and converge on a middle, in which little attention is paid
to explicit attempts to persuade an adversary of where that middle lies. See, e.g., 0.
BARTOS, supra note 6, at 10; 0. YOUNG, supra note 6, at 131-32; but see Pruitt & Lewis, The
Psychology of Integrative Bargaining,in NEGOTIATIONS, supra note 6, at 161 (a conceptualiza-

tion of bargaining that combines elements of persuasion and problem solving). These
commentators often agree that argumentation (or debate as it is more frequently called)
is an important feature of negotiation, and that it has been unwisely neglected, see, e.g.,
P.H. GULLIVER, supra note 6, at 10; Walcott, Hopmann & King, supra note 10, at 208; but
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37
presume that their disputes will be resolved according to law.
They may choose to waive this entitlement for non-legal considerations such as fear of publicity, an immediate need for cash, personal
feelings for the adversary, intolerance for conflict, moral sensibilities, and the like, and this decision is not troublesome if it represents the free choice of one value over another, when both choices
are known. But the selection of a negotiated outcome over an adjudicated one, by itself, should not be seen as a waiver of this
entitlement.3 s
If a party accepts a settlement based on an incomplete consideration of the relevant legal claims, the justice of that settlement is in
question. The absence of good legal argument increases this risk.
Incomplete and undeveloped argument causes claims to go unprotected because they are never raised. Weak and ineffective argument causes claims to be too easily conceded. Routinized or
stereotypical argument causes claims to be determined on the basis
of status quo, conservative norms that treat all cases as alike and
systematically bias outcome in favor of the haves. Stylized, ritualistic argument causes claims to be determined on the basis of factors

there is little follow-up to that conclusion. The popular negotiation literature has devoted more attention to the topic but this discussion is usually ad hoc, anecdotal, and
unsophisticated. See, e.g., H. COHEN, You CAN NEGOTIATE ANYrHING 85-87 (1980); C.
KARRASS, GIVE AND TAKE 146-47, 188-89 (1974); C. KARRASS, THE NEGOTIATING GAME
78-90 (1970); T. WARSCHAW, WINNING BY NEGOTIATION 177-94 (1980).
37. Not everyone believes that a settlement must be based, in part, on a consideration of existing law in order to be just. For some (libertarians are the most obvious
example), the relevant moral standards for private ordering are those freely chosen by
the negotiating parties, and those choices are the ones implicit in the specific agreement
reached. All affected interests must be represented and there must be an absence of
force and fraud; but if these conditions are met, a settlement is just when the parties
agree to accept it. For descriptions of philosophical positions compatible with this view,
see generally F. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUrTION OF LIBERTY 21 (1960); R. NozICK, ANARCHY,
STATE, AND UTOPIA 150-64 (1974).

38. This is particularly true at the present time in American courts, where there is
strong pressure on litigants to settle cases privately. See Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE
LJ. 1073, 1073-74 (1984); Luban, Just War & Human Rights, in PHILOSOPHY & PUBLIC
AFFAIRS 160, 167 (1980). In fact, for all practical purposes, a negotiated settlement is
the chief outcome of the adjudication process. With Fiss, I agree that something important is lost in this shift, both in the way of justice for particular litigants and in public
learning and debate about the nature and limits of legal norms. Because adjudication is
now, in effect, negotiation, it is necessary to show how the normative safeguards and
public properties of the adjudication process can be incorporated into the structure of
dispute-negotiation without destroying the efficiency and economy of the latter process.
If informal settlement is to be the legal system's formal response to disputes, standards
of justice should not be left completely to the contingent properties of particular disputes and disputants. Increasing the role of legal argument in dispute-negotiation is
one way in which adjudication and negotiation could begin to be integrated.
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such as stamina, verbal facility, persistence, tolerance for conflict, or
ruthlessness that have only a coincidental correlation with justice.

In a legal system that is itselfjust, the justice of negotiated outcomes
exists, at a minimum, to the extent the parties' competing legal
claims are competently raised, debated, and resolved.3 9
III.

GOOD

ARGUMENT

Argument must be good to perform the functions assigned to it
in dispute-negotiation. Bad argument does not inform, instruct, or
even manipulate, for understandable reasons; though qualities that
make argument bad at one of these functions might make it good at
another. Argument is good to the extent that it advances reasons

that are credible within an adversary's legitimate frame of reference.40 Because an adversary is usually a stranger, in significant respects, a negotiator must begin with a stereotype of that frame of
reference. This section sets out the elements of that stereotype. 4 '
39. I frame these propositions in terms of "claims" rather than "rights" to stay out
of the most intensely raging debate in American legal scholarship. See generally Dworkin,
Hard Cases, in TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 81, 105-23 (1982); Dworkin, "Natural" Law
Revisited, 34 U. FLA. L. REV. 165, 169-73 (1982). For other perspectives on rights, see
Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. REV. 739 (1982); Gordon, Historicism in Legal
Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1017 (1981); Kennedy, Form and Substance in PrivateLaw Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976); Mashaw, Rights in the Federal Administrative State, 92
YALE L.J. 1129 (1983); Michelman, Politics as Medicine: On Misdiagnosing Legal Scholarship,
90 YALE L.J. 1224 (1981); Unger, The CriticalLegal Studies Movement, 96 HARV. L. REV. 561
(1982).
Whether theories of rights, of whatever kind, have independent content, or are
politics masquerading as determinate rule analysis, is for others to resolve-and more
power to them. My point is simpler. Whether described as rights, claims, interests,
rules, principles, tradition, or whatever, parties to a dispute must share a set of authoritative background norms, no matter how rudimentary or limited, for principled conversation about differences to be possible. See generally R. FLATHMAN, THE PRACTICE OF
POLITICAL AUTHORITY (1982) (discussing the importance of shared background norms).
Participants in the rights debate acknowledge this, and differ primarily on the contours
and nature of those norms. Legal argument is the invocation and interpretation of
shared norms, within the language and conventions of the "community of interpretation" of lawyers. See Abraham, Statutory Interpretationand Literary Theory: Some Common
Concerns of an Unlikely Pair, 32 RUTGERS L. REV. 676, 685-86 (1975) (discussion of legal
"communities of interpretation").
40. Both the instrumental ("credible" reasons) and normative ("legitimate" frame of
reference) aspects of this definition are important. For example, a logically correct argument based upon a false premise about existing law (e.g., a contributory negligence
argument in a comparative negligence jurisdiction) that persuades because the listener
does not know that the premise is false, might be effective but not good. Whether it was
good or not would depend upon whether manipulative argument was justified in the
particular instance. See supra note 33. Good is not a synonym for "anything that works,"
but what works is an important part of the definition of good.
41. These elements do not make up a "theory" of argument in either a strong or
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These elements are advanced as minimal, consensus standards of
law-trained people. The list is not exhaustive, and it could be conceptualized differently, but in its essence, it is offered as the core of
mainstream views.
The minimum obligation of good argument is ordinary rationality.4 2 Argument must be supported by relevant reasons and evidence that are internally consistent, and logical. Certain kinds of
reasoning may be thought inappropriate for particular circumstances or issues, 43 but objections to such reasoning themselves
must be supported by reasons and evidence. Within the legal culture these canons of rationality are meta-procedures, accepted as
binding by persons holding different types of substantive beliefs. In
the act of arguing, one acknowledges and accepts the obligation to
44
abide by the canons of rationality.
Law-trained people also subscribe to additional characteristics
that are often equally important in determining what and whom to
believe. There are six such characteristics, and an argument that
possesses each in appropriate measure, ceteris paribus, is more likely
to be credible than one that does not. The six characteristics are:
detail, multidimensionality, balance, subtlety, emphasis, and
45
emotionality.
A.

Detail

A good argument is fully developed. It is particular as well as
general, graphic as well as abstract, and complicated as well as clear.
If based on an analogy, it includes an item-by-item comparison of
the elements of the situations alleged to be analogous. If based on a
rule, it asserts each of the rule's parts, clarifies relevant ambiguities,
weak sense. For theoretical discussions, see C. PERELMAN & L. OLBRECHTS-TYTECA,
supra note 16; K. REARDON, supra note 18; C. SMITH & D. HUNSAKER, THE BASES OF ARGUMENT (1972); S. TOULMIN, THE USES OF ARGUMENT (1958); C. WILLARD, ARGUMENTATION
AND THE SOCIAL GROUND OF KNOWLEDGE (1983).
For an application of the Perelman/Olbrecht-Tyteca theory to legal argument, see Haynes, The Language and Logic of
Law: A Case Study, 36 U. MIAMI L. REV. 183 (1981).
42. See C. WILLARD, supra note 41, at 13-15 (critique of the concept of "rationality").
43. See, e.g., Sagoff, supra note 34, at 1410-18 (discussion of inappropriateness of
economic reasoning for certain kinds of political questions).
44. Persons starting from incompatible substantive beliefs are likely to disagree at
the ends of their chains of reasoning, despite adherence to the canons of rationality.
The canons are a procedural system, and make argument, but not necessarily agreement, possible.
45. These are secondary characteristics in the sense that they depend on the importance of the underlying substantive topic for their influence. A detailed, multidimensional, balanced, subtle, emphatic, and emotional argument about a trivial point might
be persuasive, but is also likely to be insignificant in influencing negotiation outcome.
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and reports on similar applications. And if based on a policy, it provides evidence that the policy is genuine, and analysis that the policy
makes sense. Detail can be factual, as in a complicated story line,
evidentiary, where each aspect of the story line is supported in several independent ways, legal, where the rule, policy, or principle
framework on which the argument hangs is itself elaborate, or any
combination of these at the same time.
Detail helps a listener to see that an argument holds up to
whatever length it is played out. More than a surprising insight, or
an unusual twist on a familiar point, detail convinces a listener of the
integrity of a position, on the principle that something about which
so much can be said is often likely to be right.4 6 But detail also has a
point of diminishing return. If an argument is so complicated that a
listener cannot comprehend it within the time available to respond,
his most rational course is to ignore it and feel justified in doing so.
The use of detail is thus qualified by a rule of saturation. Detail is
appropriate as long as it informs, instructs and convinces, but not
when it overwhelms.
B.

Multidimensionality

For each issue of each legal claim, one may frame arguments
from the perspectives of rule, policy, principle, analogy, consequences, and custom.4 7 The best arguments are made in all of these
46. If a private contest takes place in every negotiator's head, in which one's own
arguments are compared with another's, the other starts with the deck stacked against
him. Arguments in the head are seen as exquisite, and complete, filled with detail, multidimensionality, subtlety, and balance. It is not that one's own arguments are regularly
this good, just that it is the private myth of most that they understand more deeply than
their words express. When they introspect, they see this depth, or think that they do,
but when they listen to another express his equivalent private vision they do no such
filling in, as indeed they cannot. They are not "in" his head. They give him the benefit
of his words and their necessary inferences, and no more. When they judge who has the
better view, their "more developed" picture wins out, as in one sense, it should. Only
by expressing argument in all of its setting, so to speak, does one have a chance of
neutralizing a listener's self-provided presumption of detail.
47. For example, in making a claim that a tenant will not be evicted from a rental
property because the property has housing code violations, a lawyer might argue, inter
alia, that particular statutory or case language articulates such a rule; that in this case an
underlying policy to maintain housing stock is served by enforcing the rule; that the
principle that one must have clean hands before claiming legal rights applies to this
landlord; that this case is like another in which eviction was refused; that the worst of all
outcomes--e.g., a rent strike-will occur if the eviction goes ahead; and that, as a practical matter, the housing court never evicts a tenant until his rental unit is brought up to
code. Each of these arguments could be quite elaborate, both in establishing the legitimacy of its norm and in applying that norm to the circumstances of its case. See G.
BELLOW & B. MOULTON, supra note 16, at 883-84. Argument from analogy may more

86

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VoL.

44:65

dimensions, where each dimension registers in its own right, but
also builds upon the others and is independently significant for what
it contributes to the sum of the argument's parts. This cumulative
effect usually increases in importance as the argument proceeds.
Multidimensionality demonstrates that a position holds up whatever
the listener's angle, perspective, or approach. It reflects a comprehensive, sophisticated, and thorough understanding.4 8 As with detail, there is a rule of saturation. Too many dimensions can
overwhelm and cause the listener to break off discussion.4 9
C.

Balance

Good argument is rarely one-sided. If a dispute reaches the
point where lawyers have been hired, pleadings filed, discovery
taken, and no resolution achieved, there is probably something to
be said for each side's position. There are familiar exceptions-the
strike suit, the neighborhood feud, the recidivist litigator-but for
the most part people do not throw good money after bad. At a minimum, negotiators usually believe that they are acting reasonably,
properly be labeled argument from example. See Haynes, supra note 41, at 246-53. But
analogy is the more familiar term in legal discourse. See E. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO
LEGAL REASONING 5 (1949). The idea of principle is intended to be broad enough to
include such notions as Bobbitt's "ethical" argument. See Bobbitt, supra note 16, at 72643.
48. In their competitive forms, multidimensionality and detail trade on the elements
of insecurity and surprise. The listener has been told something new which he feels, in
retrospect, he should have discovered in advance. He is embarrassed by his oversight
and this embarrassment produces internal agitation that makes analysis and argument
more difficult. He also may fear that there is more to the problem than he is able to
understand, and he may begin to wonder if the speaker ever will run out of new, relevant
arguments. In such circumstances concession often looks more attractive than resistance. In the literature this phenomenon is discussed under the rubrics of image loss and
loss of self-esteem. See, e.g., D. PRUIr, supra note 6, at 23-25 (discussing relationship
between image loss, face saving and concessions);J. RUBIN & B. BROWN, supra note 6, at
130-36 (discussing both self-esteem and public image problems in negotiation).
49. A detailed and multidimensional argument can sometimes be so complex that
the negotiator must deliver it all at once, in a soliloquy. A soliloquy is looked on with
suspicion, however, even when the listener cannot say how its argument fails. This reaction seems based on the belief that a soliloquy is obviously prepared, and that an obviously prepared argument is usually wrong; strong arguments write themselves, so to
speak. To avoid this problem, detailed and multidimensional argument is often advanced in a consciously conversational form. An argument's elements are made to seem
to slip out, as if occurring to the speaker at the moment (or shortly before) they are
articulated. Points are not forced into openings where they do not fit, arrangement and
sequence are adapted to the arrangement and sequence of the underlying conversation,
and positions for which the appropriate moment does not arise are dropped. Formal,
highly structured negotiation cannot always be made conversational, but most two party
dispute-negotiation is amenable to this move.
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and this belief initially must be taken as sincere. It is usually not
reasonable, therefore, to contend that one's own views are intelligent and fair, and another's unintelligent and self-serving, and argument that does so is presumptively suspect. Legitimate
considerations on each side must be acknowledged, and the resulting balance if closely struck, described as such. What is important is
that the adversary know, in his own terms, that his position has been
understood and taken into account in arriving at one's present view.
D.

Subtlety

Parties believe, rightly, in arguments they have an active hand
in shaping, and are suspicious of those preached to them. A listener
should work to understand an argument, and even discover dimensions that its proponent does not see. Subtlety is the quality that
makes this participation possible.5 ° It is achieved principally by
leaving constituent parts of argument implicit. Analysis the listener
can be expected to provide need not be expressed. Biases, beliefs,
and values that the listener is known to possess may be neutralized
or triggered, as appropriate, by choices of concepts, theories, language, and evidence. Relevant characteristics of the setting (e.g.,
plaintiff bias in a particular court, community anger at a particular
party) may be allowed to operate without being appealed to directly.
At its best, subtlety makes argument truly bilateral, and takes it out
of the realm of oratory into that of analysis.
E.

Emphasis

Argument needs focus. The structure of individual arguments,
and the arrangement of argument as a whole, should emphasize certain points above others. 5 A listener should not feel at the end of
the proverbial "shotgun," picking points out of some larger, undifferentiated barrage. In most arguments certain issues are more important than others. Sometimes this is because they represent
thresholds, such as jurisdictional claims, that must be overcome
before remaining claims have relevance. Other times it is because
50. In the speech-communication and rhetoric literature this quality is often referred
PERELMAN & L. OLBRECHTSTYTECA, supra note 16, at 230, 234; C. WILLARD, supra note 41, at 40-41. Enthymeme is
Aristotle's term for the syllogism of rhetoric. See ARISTOTLE, RHETORIC, I, 1, 1355a; II,
22, 1395b.
51. Structure and arrangement are complicated subjects in their own right, see, e.g.,
G. BELLOW & E. MOULTON, supra note 16, at 901-14, but conceptually, they are subsets of
the idea of emphasis.

to as the enthymematic property of argument. See, e.g., C.
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they have ripple effects (e.g., arguments about witness credibility),
or because they make available extraordinary recoveries (e.g., punitive or treble damage theories) or multiple substantive theories
(e.g., claims of malice, wantonness, intentionality). Failure to distinguish between important issues and those of lesser rank indicates
that a negotiator misunderstands his problem in fundamental ways,
and this misunderstanding makes his insights less trustworthy. Failure to provide emphasis also may make argument unnecessarily
confusing. Particularly if it is complex, argument is more easily understood and discussed if subdivided, periodically summarized, and
sequentially developed. The absence of these properties increases
the risk that important points will be missed because they are lost in
a mass of detail.
F.

Emotionality

Trustworthy argument has an emotional as well as an analytical
side; believable argument is always more than just logically arranged
words and ideas. This emotion is rarely extreme. Seriousness is
usually more appropriate than anger, annoyance more appropriate
than disgust, conviction more appropriate than certainty. Emotion
is necessary, in principal part, because argument is about right and
wrong. Whether moral and political norms are discussed as such, or
as embodied in legal rules, argument is advanced to achieve justice,
no matter how attenuated a negotiator's awareness of this purpose
may be. Discussions of right and wrong involve more than the solving of intellectual puzzles. They are serious political and moral undertakings and persons engaged in them must likewise be serious.
If they are not, their views will be thought less worthy of attention.52
52. This does not mean that a negotiator must believe in the literal truth of his client's arguments before he can corroborate them with emotion. Like the actor, the negotiator can juxtapose a text-his argument-to an authentic emotional state-e.g.,
anger-called up by focusing part of his attention on an experience with which the emotion is genuinely associated. For discussion of this dramatic technique, see C. EDWARDS,
THE STANISLAVSKY HERITAGE 149-59 (1965); S. MOORE, THE STANISLAVSKI SYSTEM 54-57
(1960). The emotional state must be authentic, but it need not be produced by the
experience of the text. If the text and emotion are juxtaposed correctly, the listener's
most logical inference is that the cause of the emotion is what is said. Whether a lawyer
is morally entitled to "act" in a given instance is a separate and difficult question. See
supra note 33.

Emotion also helps avoid a kind of vulgar double-bind. If a negotiator advances
an argument, the thrust of which is serious, yet does not seem serious, he sends two
messages rather than one. This will confuse the listener, who will not know which
message to trust. While confused, a listener is likely to suspend judgment, and not believe anything until the messages sort themselves out. The nonverbal, emotional realm
must corroborate the verbal, or it will undercut it.
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The foregoing characteristics of good argument work in combination. Each checks the excesses and bolsters the contributions of
the others. For example, emphasis and subtlety prevent detail from
becoming unwieldy and insulting. Emotionality prevents multidimensional argument from becoming overly clever, and is itself
restricted by the requirement of balance, and so on. Good argument is an amalgam of these characteristics, each in appropriate
measure. Emphasizing all aspects of the typology equally is a starting point. But as negotiation proceeds, and assessment makes the
adversary's frame of reference clearer, good argument emphasizes
those characteristics that have the greatest salience within this frame
of reference.
The concepts of this and the preceding section provide a framework for analyzing the argument excerpts in section V. But they
also suggest important qualifications on conclusions drawn in that
analysis. Negotiation argument is a complex phenomenon that depends heavily on context for its meaning, and much of that complexity is lost when argument is isolated for analysis.53 Arguments
that look ill-advised on their face often have important strategic purposes. Hyperbolic or inflammatory argument can goad an adversary
into revealing secret information about his theory of the case.
Clever but flawed argument can test an adversary's skill at analysis.
Argument based on incorrect summaries of evidence, or on false
descriptions of court practices, can measure an adversary's level of
preparation or extent of experience. Repetitive or routinized argument can create space between offers, to help make concessions appear grudging. While deficient as pure advocacy, each of these
kinds of argument, in context, could be intended to serve important
negotiation objectives. Accordingly, complete evaluation of negotiation argument always must ask more than "Does it persuade?" For
the most part, the arguments in section V may be taken at face value
as efforts to persuade-at least this is the judgment that was made in
selecting them. But a certain caution is required in analyzing these
arguments, and if the arguments are unconvincing, it does not follow that they served no purpose.
IV.

THE LERCH SIMULATION

Lerch v. McDane is a simulated negotiation problem developed
to collect representative data on negotiation argument. The goal of
the simulation was to determine whether negotiation argument pos53. See Walcott, Hopmann & King, supra note 10, at 193.
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sessed the characteristics described in the preceding sections, and if
it did, why it was not taken more seriously by lawyers and law students. The simulation placed participants in a life-like negotiation
setting, in which part of the task was to resolve substantive
law dif54
ferences between antagonistic parties to a lawsuit.
The problem involved the transfer of an inmate (Lerch) of the
54. The simulation was given to approximately 200 law students in three law schools
(one elite and the other two non-elite), in three geographical regions over a five-year
period. The students responsible for the argument excerpts in section V had combined
grade point averages and Law School Admission Test scores that put them in the top
10% of all law school applicants, and all were in the top third of their class at an elite law
school. (The simulation also was done by 16 lawyers, but this quantity is not large
enough to be representative.)
There is reason to be skeptical of research based on student subjects. As a
group, they do not always embody habits, beliefs, and values in proportions representative of the subject population at large, and in using students, one may discover nothing
-more profound than the 'social psychology of the college sophomore.'" J. RUBIN & B.
BROWN, supra note 6, at 297. In the present research this concern is less serious. Most
of the students (including all of those whose argument excerpts are reproduced in the
next section), were in their third year of law school, had worked in law firms for at least
one and often two summers, and had practiced law in their own right during the school
year under a student practice rule. They were well along the path to being socialized
into the lawyer role. In addition, the task studied-legal argument from doctrine, rule,
and policy-is performed similarly in both real life and simulated settings, and is as
much within the capacities of students as lawyers. The nature of the motivation to perform well, principally the desire to impress professional colleagues with one's craftsmanship, is also the same in both settings. See generally Landon, Lawyers and Localities: The
Interaction of Community Context and Professionalism, 1982 AM. B. FOUND. RESEARCH J. 459,
477; Wilensky, The Professionalizationof Everyone?, 70 AM. J. Soc. 137 (1964).
The subjects aside, it is also difficult to generalize from research based on simulated problems. It is easier to concede one's own interest (in the simulation) than a
client's; a hypothetical client interest is not as compelling as a real one; and academic
games are not often thought worthy of a serious, all-out effort. In addition, simulation
subjects frequently play to the "audience," i.e., anyone recognized as entitled to evaluate their performance, and seek positive evaluation by behaving in accordance with the
audience's preferred positions, whether the subjects would choose the same positions
for themselves or not. See J. RUBIN & B. BROWN, supra note 6, at 43-54. In the parlance
of law school, simulation subjects often "give the experimenter what he wants."
These concerns notwithstanding, Lerch participants worked hard, worried about
their performances, pulled few punches, and invested hours in preparation, taping, and
review. Inadequate effort (e.g., arbitrary conceding to end the exercise, collusive bargaining about how to win at the exercise, or other examples of out-of-role behavior)
appears on less than 5% of the total tape time, and all of the meetings between the
bargainers were taped. It is hard to imagine the participants being more strongly motivated in any other setting, including law practices. Playing to the audience was a serious
problem, however, and is discussed infra pp. 128-29.
The simulation was somewhat non-lifelike in that it emphasized substantive legal
argument. This emphasis may be traced to three factors. First, the hypothetical facts
were thinner than those of real life. The bargainers knew little about the testimonial
qualities of the parties and witnesses, or the predilections of the judge or jurors who
would decide the case if settlement was not reached. This made it difficult to argue
factual disagreements to a conclusion, since resolution of such disputes would often turn

1985]

ARGUMENT IN LEGAL DISPUTE-NEGOTIATION

Virginia prison system from a minimum to a maximum security facility, without a hearing and under the authority of a new and untested
prison regulation (the new transfer regulation) providing for inmate
"assignment." ' 55 Lerch had a history of disorderly conduct, fighting,
stealing drugs, and threatening other inmates, and, according to
prison officials, was transferred for these reasons. Lerch believed
that he had been made the scapegoat for disturbances created by
other inmates, and that he was transferred on the basis of false and
misleading information given to prison officials by informants within
the prison. The transfer ended Lerch's treatment for drug addiction
and deprived him of access to prison rehabilitative and education
programs.
The central legal question to be resolved by the negotiators was
whether Lerch had a due process right to a pre-transfer hearing. At
on the credibility of persons who would tell the conflicting stories. "Legal" argument
had to take up the slack.
Second, real client needs were missing, and the students were not familiar with
the physical and emotional experience of prison. This made arguments based on principle and consequences difficult, because the listener would know that the arguer's heart
was not in it. Arguments about cases and statutes are the essence of law school conversation, however, and this familiarity gave them credence, even in a simulation. Put another way, only the legal argument was real.
Third, the background norms of the simulation differed in significant respects
from those of law practice. In practice, the case would have a stereotypical settlement
point (or points, closely bunched) known to each side as a category in its lawyer's head.
See supra note 3. There might be disagreement about whether the case fit into one category or another, and perhaps a discussion of whether it could be categorized at all, but
with these issues resolved, deciding upon a settlement amount would consist of applying
a shared norm. This would discourage extensive argument. Lawyers would believe that
they knew what the case was worth and that arguing about it would not change that
assessment. They would argue some, because stating a bottom line at the outset could
easily be misinterpreted, but not in as much detail as someone not privy to the background norms. The background norms of a law school simulation have to do with the
comparative quality of arguments more than the value of legal claims. Students know
how to distinguish good argument from bad, but not how to put a value on cases, and
would apply these standards of argument even without planning to. This predisposition
reinforced the problem's bias in favor of legal argument, albeit of the game-playing
variety.
55. The regulation provided that:
Prisoners shall be assigned according to the nature of the offense for which
convicted, the prospect of rehabilitation and the need for professional or medical care, to the correction facility which best meets the circumstances of that
case. Although prisoners may be reassigned to another prison facility for disciplinary reasons, no prisoner shall be assigned to any institution if such assignment will impair ongoing rehabilitation, prevent adequate medical treatment or
result in the prisoner's incarceration with inmates whose offenses are much
more serious than his own, unless such reassignment is absolutely necessary for
the protection of any inmate or the security of any institution. (Effective March
1, 1979).
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the time of the arguments in Section V, the decisions of Meachum v.
Fano,56 and Lamb v. Hutto5 7 were particularly important. 58 In
Meachum, six Massachusetts prisoners charged that hearing-less
transfers to prisons with conditions less favorable than their own
deprived them of rights under the due process clause.5 9 On review,
the Supreme Court rejected the notion that any "grievous" loss visited upon an inmate by the state is sufficient to invoke due process
protection. "That life in one prison is more disagreeable than life in
another does not in itself signify that a Fourteenth Amendment lib60
erty interest is implicated."
The Court distinguished Wolff v. McDonnell 6 ' on the ground
that the prisoner liberty interest in Wolff originated in a state statute
that conditioned the loss of good time credits on a finding of serious
misconduct. When the determination of whether misconduct had
occurred was critical to the administrative decision, the due process
clause required a hearing to prevent arbitrary treatment. 6 2 In contrast, in Meachum there was no statute-based liberty interest to which
due process protections could attach. Since "Massachusetts prison
officials [had] discretion to transfer prisoners . . for whatever rea56. 427 U.S. 215 (1976).
57. 467 F. Supp. 562 (E.D. Va. 1979). Lamb was decided by the same court that
would hear Lerch's claim. Subsequent to these negotiations, the Fourth Circuit, in
Gorham v. Hutto, 667 F.2d 1146 (4th Cir. 1981), substantially vitiated Lamb.
58. The Supreme Court had not then decided Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460 (1983);
Olin v. Wakinekona, 456 U.S. 1005 (1983); or Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980).
59. The prisoners were removed from the general population at the Massachusetts
Correctional Institution at Norfolk after a period of serious unrest. After removal but
before transfer, each prisoner was given an individual classification hearing, in which he
was represented by counsel and given notice of the charges against him. The charges
were based on statements by prison informants. In camera, and out of the prisoners'
presence, the classification board heard the testimony of the prison superintendent, who
repeated the information that had been received from the informants. Each prisoner
was allowed to present evidence on his own behalf, and each denied involvement in the
particular infraction(s) with which he was charged. Although the prisoners were aware
of the general import of the informants' allegations, the details of this information were
not revealed or included in the Board's report. No prisoner was subjected to disciplinary punishment at his new prison, and none of the transfers entailed the loss of good
time. Meachum, 427 U.S. at 216-22.
60. Id. at 225. The Court was concerned that so broad a reading of the due process
clause would subject to judicial review a wide spectrum of discretionary actions traditionally reserved to prison administrators. As an example, the Court mentioned a
"transfer made on the basis of informed predictions as to what would best serve institutional security or the safety and welfare of an inmate." Id.
61. 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
62. See Meachum, 427 U.S. at 226. "The liberty interest in Wolff had its roots in state
law, and the . . . [due process protections] were . . . required

state created right [was] not arbitrarily abrogated.' " Id.

. . .

'to insure that the
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son, or no reason at all, a prisoner's expectation of remaining at a
particular prison so long as he [behaved] himself . . . [was] too
ephemeral and insubstantial to trigger procedural due process protections."63 The Court concluded with a warning against federal
judges sitting in supervision of the day-to-day functioning of state
prisons.64
In Lamb v. Hutto6 5 a Virginia prisoner (Lamb) alleged a deprivation of free speech and due process rights because he had been
transferred without a hearing 66 from the Virginia State Penitentiary
to the Mecklenburg Correctional Center. Summary judgment was
granted against the first amendment count, 6 7 but on the due process
claim the Court found that "in Virginia . . . it appears to be standard practice that pre-transfer hearings, conducted according to
published procedural standards, are afforded inmates who are about
to be reclassified or transferred to a higher security level," 6 8 and
held "that reliance upon published institutional regulations creates
a 'justifiable expectation to a hearing rooted in state law.' "69 The
63. Id. at 228.
64. Id. at 228-29. Meachum is complicated by the fact that three Justices (Stevens,
Brennan, and Marshall) dissented. Relying principally on Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S.
471 (1972), they would have held that prisoners, even while confined, have liberty interests more extensive than those originating in the Constitution or created by state statute, and would have interpreted the due process clause to include protection against any
"sufficiently grievous" change in status. What constitutes "grievous" would be decided
case by case, and the dissenters would have found the loss in Meachum grievous. Id. at
229-35.
65. 467 F. Supp. 562 (E.D. Va. 1979).
66. Id. at 564. Lamb was given an Institutional Classification Committee hearing
prior to his transfer, but contended that the Committee did not follow its own procedures at the hearing. He made additional claims of being beaten and having his mail
stopped that, at least explicitly, were not factors in the part of the Lamb opinion relevant
to Lerch. Id. at 564-65.
67. Id. at 565-66. The Court agreed that Lamb's interest in testifying was a first
amendment interest, and though a transfer does not generally give rise to due process
protections, it may not be used to retaliate for the exercise of constitutional rights.
Analogizing to cases involving the failure to renew the contracts of nontenured public
employees, the Court held that a constitutional violation could be established only by
showing that the decision to transfer would not have been made absent the occurrence
of the constitutionally protected conduct. "The Court [must] determine if plaintiffs
transfer was justifiable on grounds other than his alleged refusal to succumb to defendant's alleged threats." Id. at 566. It found ample evidence that it was, in unrebutted
prison official affidavits recounting a history of disciplinary offenses by Lamb. Id.
68. Lamb, 467 F. Supp. at 566.
69. Id. (citation omitted). This and the preceding passage, particularly their distinctions between a practice and published regulations, and reclassification and transfer,
would prove to be the most controversial part of the Lamb opinion. The thrust of the
passages was subsequently rejected in Gorham v. Hutto, 667 F.2d 1146, 1148 (4th Cir.
1981).
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Court also concluded that Lamb was entitled to notice of the
charges against him and the right to call witnesses, and gave him
leave to amend his complaint to state how these rights had been
denied.70

The Lerch problem was similar to Meachum and Lamb but identical to neither. Lerch's transfer was not in retaliation for the exercise
of substantive constitutional rights, but his regulation-based rights
to "rehabilitation, medical treatment, and incarceration with people
whose offenses are no more serious than his own,"" made his claim
more than one for a prison of his choice or for favorable conditions
of confinement. The new transfer regulation made no mention of a
hearing, but its recitation of the above restrictions, in effect, may
72
have conditioned transfer on the occurrence of "specified events,"
the existence of which must be found in a hearing.
There were additional legal issues present in Lerch. For example, it was not clear whether the new transfer regulation impliedly
repealed the regulations relied on in Lamb, or whether those regulations continued in effect and provided Lerch with an independent
basis for his due process claim. Nor did the new transfer regulation
specify whether a Virginia prisoner could be assigned or transferred
to a higher security facility without being reclassified, or if reclassification was necessary, whether it could be done without a hearing.
And finally, a key issue was whether a practice of providing pretransfer hearings created an expectation rooted in state law, independent of statutory or regulatory language. These were not the
only issues, but they were the most important ones in the argument
excerpts that follow.
Simulation participants represented Lerch or McDane, then the
Virginia Commissioner of Corrections. Each was given a detailed
background file, 73 and each was permitted to ask for additional information he believed he would have had in the actual negotiation
70. Lamb, 467 F. Supp. at 566-67.
71. See supra note 55.
72. Meachum, 427 U.S. at 227.
73. This file included personal information about Lerch or McDane, a history of
events (including trial and appeal) leading up to Lerch's incarceration, an account of
Lerch's prison behavior prior to his transfer, summaries of relevant documents in
Lerch's prison file, a copy of the new Virginia transfer regulation, findings by correction
officials on which Lerch's transfer was based, and an account of Lerch's difficulties (including medical difficulties) in adjusting to his new prison facility. Appropriate parts of
this information were provided in two versions, one written from Lerch's perspective
and the other from McDane's. Participants also were encouraged to draw on what they
knew about the personalities and facilities that made up the Virginia prison system, and
popular attitudes about prisons and prisoners in the state in general.
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of the case. 74 Participants were given three weeks to reach an agreement.7 5 They could meet as frequently as they liked, and at any
time; all negotiating sessions were videotaped.7 6 Three argument
excerpts have been selected from the tapes of the negotiations.7 7
74. All requests for public or discoverable information were answered. If information would have come in discovery, the adversary was told what was provided.
75. If they did not settle, participants were required to write a brief (of no less than
ten pages) on the merits, within five days of deadlock. This requirement was intended to
approximate the cost in having to prepare for trial. Some refused to allow self-interest
to dictate a bad settlement, but most avoided the brief at any cost.
Three weeks was probably not enough time. In practice, one prepares for negotiation in stages. One has one level of understanding when giving preliminary advice at
the initial client interview, another when drafting the complaint, another after discovery,
and perhaps another after preparing for bargaining itself. In the intervals, understanding percolates and evolves, even when the case is not being worked on, contributing in
hard-to-describe but nonetheless real ways to making subsequent views more sophisticated. In Lerch, the time between introduction to the problem and the bargaining itself
left little opportunity for mulling around, percolation, or editing. Students spent as
many total hours on Lerch as they would have in practice, but having to compress that
time into a three-week space was a problem.
76. A room permanently outfitted with recording equipment, controlled from a studio in an adjoining room, was reserved for the bargaining sessions and a technician was
always available to operate the studio. Participants had only to enter the room and begin to bargain. They were not wired for sound, normal lighting was used, and the room
was furnished as a law office conference room. The taping was intended not only to
collect data, but to prod participants into trying hard to succeed. It was assumed that
students would be motivated by the desire to do a craftsmanlike job, and the camera
stood as a proxy for the audience. See supra note 54.
77. The excerpts are misleading in two respects. First, each negotiation is made up
of more than argument. The bargainers exchanged pleasantries, discussed tangential
issues, traded a wide variety of items through offers and counter-offers, and marked time
by talking about little or nothing of significance. The discussions had many of the overall qualities of ordinary conversation. On the other hand, argument is the best representative of the emphasis in the conversations. This is because the participants were unable
to answer the question "What does your client want?", a commonplace starting point for
experienced lawyers. This fuzziness about objectives is explained by the absence of instructions in the problem's materials (by design, as part of the task was to formulate a
definition of successful outcome), by the fact that the students were novices at thinking
about negotiation in terms of outcome, and by the absence of a client to consult. They
did know, however, that they wanted to have the better ef the legal argument.
Second, each excerpt is not the whole of the negotiator's argument. It was common to add new points at irregular intervals throughoutthe negotiation so that cumulative argument was more sophisticated than any single statement of it. It is not clear,
however, that subsequent and irregularly made points had a measurable effect. After
issue was joined and disagreement registered, argument often became repetitive and
routinized. Attention diminished and participants looked for means other than argument to reach an agreement. Often, they did not hear new points or did not see them as
connected to earlier arguments. While the excerpts do not present all of the participants' views, therefore, they present those parts that probably had the most effect.
That the excerpts contain "just words" also warrants mention. The bargainers
had individual and interdependent histories as classmates, friends, and co-simulants.
They had racial, sexual, and class identities. They communicated nonverbally through
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Each of the excerpts illustrates a different approach to the due process argument, and each is the best representative of a genre of argument found generally in the tapes. Collectively, the excerpts
represent the participants' most common approaches to the due
process question.7 8
V.

EXAMPLES AND ANALYSIS

A.

DE v. ML *

This excerpt defines one end of the spectrum of Lerch arguments-the weakest arguments. The negotiators are highly excited
and seem to be resolving difficult questions, but in fact, they never
join issue on any substantive point. They are combative rather than
assertive, intransigent rather than firm, and belligerent rather than
aggressive. One of the parties is disproportionately responsible for
these qualities, but it was also common for each to be equally at
fault. This excerpt is an example of the failure to argue, and is
found about ten percent of the time on the Lerch tapes. DE represents Lerch and ML represents McDane.
1)

ML:

2)

DE:

3)
4)

ML:
DE:

Okay, let's go over this Complaint a little bit to see what
you have.
Well, we're asking for relief in five different areas, and if
you don't mind, I'd like to take them one at a time.
I don't mind.
The first thing we're asking for is reassignment, and we
want to go back to where we came from.

gesture, tone, expression, pace, and inflection. And the exercise as a whole took place
within an institutional and social setting that had its own practices, procedures, and substantive norms. These factors gave meaning to their communication that is not captured
completely in transcriptions of their words. For a discussion of such factors, see
Condlin, supra note 20, at 251 n.68. Not that words are unimportant, but in analyzing
texts a certain modesty is called for. A text is a slice of reality, and not always the most
important slice. This analysis may be thought of as a hermeneutics of negotiation argument. For a discussion of hermeneutics, see Hermann, Phenomenology, Structuralism, Hermeneutics, and Legal Study: Applications of Contemporary Continental Thought to Legal
Phenomena, 36 U. MIAMI L. REV. 379, 398-404 (1982); cf Gordon, Historicism in Legal
Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1017 (1982) (discussion of the need -for more historicist legal
scholarship).

78. Due process arguments have been selected because due process was the most
important issue in the problem. It was irrational to try to resolve the dispute without
talking about Lerch's due process rights, and no one tried to. Such argument also is
paradigmatically legal, consisting of case interpretation and policy analysis, and loses
little of its nuance when based on hypothetical facts.
* These initials are not those of the actual participants.
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Well, where you came from was out in society at large,
so you are not going back that far.
6) DE: No.
7) ML: Just how far back in time do you want to go? Now, for
you to get any kind of...
8) DE: Well, listen, the reassignment thing, I don't think we
should spend that much time on it. We've got the law
on our side, the case of Lamb v. Hutto has just been decided recently. This is decided by a guy who, that the
judge in this case had decided previously in other cases
against us on the same issue, interpreting the law on this
point. There's really no sense in...
9) ML: Well, I think there is sense in talking about that case, if
you want to talk about that case in particular.
10) DE: Well, I'm not, well, I'm just talking about the holding in
that case. It said that what happened here can't be
done, legally. I mean...
11) ML: That's not true. If we were dealing with a case that had
arisen at the same time as Lamb v. Hutto, that might be a
little bit different. However, this case arose somewhat
later. As you know, the regulations in the prison have
been changed. Now Lamb came down in March of 1979,
March 29. These new regs came out on March 1. These
new regs were not the subject of the decision in Lamb.
That case came up that fast.
12) DE: The new regs that are ours now are even more in our
favor than the Lamb reg.
13) ML: That is not quite clear.
14) DE: Well in any case, if you are willing to litigate this issue of
transfer you're going to lose.
15) ML: Fine, But anyway I would still like to see now why I am
going to lose. I would like you to tell me where in this
new reg, I think Lamb we can just throw out because
Lamb does not ...
16) DE: What your people did here was transfer somebody without reclassifying him. Their claim is that he needn't be
reclassified . ..
17) ML: Under the new regs?
18) DE: Yeah, he was sent from a minimum security prison to a
maximum security prison.
19) ML: It happens.
20) DE: But it shouldn't happen.
21) ML: Under the regs transfers are excepted from the jurisdic-
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tion of the ICC [Institutional Classification Committee].
I believe you know that. You should know that. That is

22)
23)
24)
25)

DE:
ML:
DE:
ML:

26)

DE:

the way that our system is set up.
Well then let's talk about the system because...
Let's talk about the reg.
I think I'm more interested in the system right now.
Well right now I'm interested in the reg. I would like to
know in the reg where you derive the kind of liberty interest that you have to show which would allow a due
process claim in this case. I would just like to see it in
the regs.
I think I am going to talk to you about the prison system
as a whole, then, because I think we can use this case as
a way to settle. .

27)
28)
29)
30)

ML:
DE:
ML:
DE:

31)

ML:

32)
33)

DE:
ML:

34)
35)
36)
37)

DE:
ML:
DE:
ML:

38)

DE:

.

. I've got six other cases pending on

this kind of thing. If you want to make a big...
Let's talk about this case.
I'm not that interested in this case.
I am. I mean that's the authority that I have.
See all this stuff here? This is information on six other
cases that I've got coming down. Same case as this one,
same issue as this one and I don't want to sit here across
from you talking about the same thing five more times.
So maybe we should set up something regarding the
whole system whether or not ...
Well, let me tell you this. I am here on authority right
now to discuss Lerch.
And that's it?
And that's it. I am not here to discuss the other cases.
Let's talk about Lerch. If we can work something out in
the context of Lerch that might help you with these other
cases, fine. Right now...
Are you going to transfer Lerch back?
We're not going to transfer Lerch back.
Then let's talk about ...
Let's talk about this reg which is going to be the same
basis of the decision that you're going to be seeking in
all these other six cases. Let's talk about the reg. That's
the basis of this transcript. Why are you afraid to talk
about this regulation?
I am not afraid to talk about this regulation. I find no
value in talking about the regulation because you are
not going to convince me that you have acted lawfully

1985]

ARGUMENT IN LEGAL DISPUTE-NEGOTIATION

39)
40)
41)

ML:
DE:
ML:

42)

DE:

43)
44)
45)
46)
47)
48)

ML:
DE:
ML:
DE:
ML:
DE:

49)
50)

ML:
DE:

51)

ML:

52)

DE:

53)
54)
55)
56)

ML:
DE:
ML:
DE:

57)

ML:

58)

DE:

59)
60)

ML:
DE:
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and legally here and that my guy, if I went to court,
would not get transferred back.
Show me how. Just show me how.
What do you mean show you how?
Show me how you're going to prevail on a constitutional
claim, on a due process claim, given the reg that is on
page two of the record.
This regulation on page two says that no prisoner shall
be assigned to any institution if such assignment will impair ongoing rehabilitation. Is he being rehabilitated?
Did it impair the rehabilitation?
Was he being rehabilitated? Through medication?
Attempts were being made.
Was he getting medication?
He was getting medication.
Is he getting medication now? Is it the same kind of
medication?
No.
Okay, so there's an argument. Would it prevent adequate medical treatment?
Time out, time out, time out! If you want to go through
the reg we are going to go through it but I am not going
to go through the reg...
I am not going to go through the reg with you. This is a
threshold issue as far as we're concerned.
Well then let's . . .
Reassignment.
Let's start at the threshold.
The threshold is reassignment. I want him reassigned.
I believe that Lamb is sufficient in itself, that regulation is
sufficient in itself, if we ligitate this issue there is no
doubt in my mind that he will be transferred back. I am
willing to talk about the other things. We are not going
to talk any further about this unless you want to put it in
the context of five different cases that I have got right
here that can fit within this type of thing. Otherwise,
reassignment now.
Get one thing straight. I make the decisions for the prisons and you don't. All right? Fine. Now.
Make your decision, make your decision, reassignment
or no.
No.
Okay, then we are not going to talk about . . .
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61)
62)
63)

ML:
DE:
ML:

64)
65)
66)
67)

DE:
ML:
DE:
ML:

68)
69)
70)
71)
72)

DE:
ML:
DE:
ML:
DE:
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Yes we are. I am just going to tell you one thing.
Yeah.
And you're going to just sit there and listen because I
have the right to talk at this hearing too.
I know.
All right, so just listen for a second.
Reassignment, tell me about it.
Reassignment. They have no right to reassignment first
of all. Just cool it. You think Lamb controls. Lamb did
not decide on the basis of this reg. The basis of Lamb,
Lamb acknowledged under Meachum there is no general
right for pre-transfer hearing.
Not correct.
Is that the general basis, yes or no?
Wrong.
The general basis.
Wrong, wrong, wrong.

Several times ML encourages DE to analyze the due process
question, and even makes an argument that such analysis is necessary. Occasionally he sermonizes but not without provocation, or
for very long, and at the end of the excerpt he is still trying, though
less enthusiastically, to provoke such a discussion; but DE refuses to
join issue. He deviates from this pattern on only two occasions and
even this characterization gives him the benefit of the doubt. DE's
statements are little more than unsupported, self-serving conclusions. It is not just that he fails to give reasons for his assertions,
but that he overstates, is incongruously emotional, and seems closed
to any other view. His statements are not so much bad argument, as
the refusal to argue, and in the end, he may bring ML to his level.
Particular examples will illustrate these points. 79
DE takes the first position, that Lamb v. Hutto dictates reassignment (8, 10). As he states it, the claim lacks detail and multidimensionality. Lamb is not analogized to Lerch; its holding is not
formulated as a rule to be applied to Lerch; and the cases are not
compared in any other dimension, whether policy, principle, or con79. Interpretations throughout are intended as suggestive rather than exhaustive.
For a discussion of the limitless possibilities of such analysis, see Condlin, supra note 20,
at 251 n.68. I draw on information about the participants and the setting that make my
interpretive frame of reference different from the reader's (just as any single reader's
will be different from any other's). It is inevitable that I do this, though I shall try to
support conclusions with evidence taken only from the dialogue.
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sequences. DE could not do all of this in an opening statement, of
course, but he does not even begin to do it, and he does not develop
such points at any time in the exchange. ML's response (11) ignores
several factual differences between Lamb and Lerch, and, in its own
way, suffers from a lack of detail, but it begins an analysis of Lamb
and as such, is an invitation to go more deeply into the topic. DE
changes the subject (14, 16).
In statements 16-20, a limited argument seems to appear. DE
makes a distinction between transfer and classification, and asserts
that Lerch was transferred without being reclassified (16). He does
not identify the significance of this distinction, or say how it is related to the regulation being parsed (12, 15), but his comment invites a response. Unfortunately, he is cut off (17), and does not take
the opportunity for more extended remarks when it becomes available (20). ML responds briefly, and is still discussing the issue (21)
when DE changes the topic again (22). It may be incorrect to describe this as an argument. Issues are identified more than analyzed
and few if any of the properties of good argument described in section III are present, but it is as close as the parties get to a substantive exchange, though they get this close often.
In segment 22-33, DE avoids substantive argument by making
what might be a threat to bring a class action. If a threat, however, it
is largely inchoate. He does not talk in terms of the elements of a
class action, such as common questions of law and fact, typicality of
claims, and numerosity, or indicate in any other way that he has
thought out the class action issue (30). At the same time, ML continues to encourage analysis of the transfer regulation, initially with
questions (25), and requests (23, 27), but eventually, with his own
kind of threat: That is, if you persist on this topic, we shall have to
break off negotiation because I am not authorized to discuss it (29,
31, 33). Sometimes he is subtle (25), and sometimes direct (37), but
DE refuses all overtures (38), seemingly on the ground that substantive issues are non-debatable ("you are not going to convince me
. . .that my guy, if I went to court, would not get transferred back")
(38). He seems to be saying that his is the only reasonable view.
DE's intransigence takes its toll. ML frames as a demand what
could be put as a question (39), and his tone becomes strident, his
pace quick, and his expression angry. This may cause DE to waiver,
because for a moment he makes what might be thought of as a textual argument for Lerch's right to rehabilitation. But the argument
refers to the regulation's text more than analyzes it (44, 46, 48, 50)
and its tone does not invite a reply. After one final effort ("Let's
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start at the threshold.") (55), which DE rebuffs ("no doubt in my
mind") (56), ML abandons his effort to analyze the regulation, and
simply asserts his authority (57, 61, 63, 65). After this flare-up, he
invites substantive discussion again (67), but there is little likelihood
now that the parties will discuss substance.
As the negotiation continued, the tone became harsher, the exchanges shorter, threats, including the threat of deadlock, more frequent, and strong opinion more prominent. After forty minutes,
the parties acknowledged that they were at an impasse and turned to
pure trading to resolve the dispute. Legal issues were not discussed, except as "filler," 8 from that point on.
DE's arguments are obviously bad, to the point of being nonexistent. They have no detail or multidimensionality, their emphases
are erratic, and their emotions extreme. Norms are referred to
rather than invoked, and demeaned rather than elaborated. Issues
are occasionally identified, but never pursued. The arguments have
few of the characteristics described in section III, and many characteristics that could be expected to (and did) produce impasse.81
This excerpt illustrates the substitution of conflict for argument.
B.

RK v. BM

This exchange takes place a few minutes after the parties begin
to talk.8 2 It is interrupted by a long aside (omitted), in which one of
the bargainers introduces a surprise argument-a reading of the
80. Generally, in the latter stages of negotiation, argument became more routinized
and automatic, and seemed to be used to fill time while new moves were being planned,
or to create space between offers so as to make concessions appear more grudging. This
is what is meant by "filler" argument.
81. It is hard to know what to make of such statements coming from intelligent and
successful law students. They look like the ferocious bellowing of two great bulls (the
students were male) about to enter mortal combat over territory or a mate. The arguments would not be surprising as opening moves, while the negotiators were jockeying
for position, but the patterns did not change, and, if anything, got worse as the negotiation progressed. Argument of this sort is all too common in the Lerch negotiations. A
typical scenario is that of salvo-salvo-truce. Each side overstates in comparable measure;
the overstatements cancel each other out; impasse is acknowledged; and the dispute is
resolved on nonsubstantive grounds.
Perhaps this is done to show membership in the lawyer club, and facility at lawyer wordplay. Or perhaps it is intended to allow each participant to think that he did all
that he could for his client because he shouted at his adversary (literally as well as metaphorically), while simultaneously avoiding conflicts sufficiently important to rupture social relationships. DE's actions, in particular, may be explained as attempts to advance
his position without revealing private information, to intimidate ML, or to rub in his
belief that, after Lamb, he could not lose in court. None of these motives sees argument
as a mechanism for connecting substantive norms and negotiation outcome.
82. Each of the excerpts is taken from somewhere near the beginning of its meeting,
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Virginia prison system enabling act that allegedly gives different
powers to the Director and Assistant Director of Corrections-that,
on reflection, proves inconclusive. Including the aside, the exchange continues for twenty minutes. RK represents Lerch and BM
represents McDane.
This excerpt has less antagonism and defensiveness than the
first. The parties seem interested in substantive analysis and make
what appears to be a good faith effort to achieve it. In the end, however, their argument is only marginally more sophisticated than the
first exchange.8 3 Issues are not defined to each party's satisfaction,
the discussion does not progress logically or in an organized fashion, issue spotting is more common than analysis, and the negotiators talk past one another throughout, never finding a common
ground. Structural confusion is the defining feature of the segment.
This was the dominant pattern in the Lerch arguments as a group. It
appeared to some extent on virtually every tape and was the principal characteristic on over half. This excerpt looks like the single
largest group of Lerch arguments.
1) BM:

2)

RK:

I guess what I'm asking you is under what authority,
legal authority that is, you feel that you are entitled to a
reassignment, first of all expungement, second of all inspection, third of all, etc.
Well, we think going under 1983, I'm sure you are familiar with the cases of Meachum, Haymes, Wolff, that series of
cases indicating that when in state law practice a prisoner has a justifiable expectation in not being transferred unless certain things happen, that he is entitled to
minimum due process and in those cases, as I am sure
you know, the prisoner was given a hearing, and all sorts
of things, and the question really turned on whether or
not he could cross examine people. Here, we, this guy
was awakened at 5:00 in the morning, and taken way
across the state. He never was given an explanation the
whole way through. He didn't know what was going on
and there was no hearing of any type. It's not a question

but not by design. As it turned out, the due process question was usually discussed first,
and the most developed examples of that argument appeared early in the negotiations.
83. What is perhaps surprising about the excerpts is how little one can learn about
the substantive law of prison transfers by reading what the participants say and making
all reasonable inferences.
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3)

4)
5)
6)
7)
8)

9)
10)

11)
12)
13)

14)
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of whether the due process he was given was adequate.
There was none.
BM: Well, I'm under the impression that in Meachum and
Lamb it was a question of whether or not there was an
entitlement to a hearing, as well as in Wolff.
RK: Well in Wolff...
BM: It was basically the same issue.
RK: Well, okay in Wolff, I may have my facts wrong . . .
BM: I think so.
RK: Okay. Well, at any rate, we claim that a hearing and the
basic twenty-four hour notice to a hearing, notice for a
hearing, at least that and the right to produce more evidence, to bring witnesses, to testify on our side, that we
should have gotten that minimum due process. And the
reason we think that, is that...
the language in Meachum says a reasonable expectation
or justifiable expectation, and I think that given this, you
certainly have to agree that Lerch, being aware of these
regulations, had a justifiable expectation that he would
not be sent at 5:00 in the morning across the state like
he was.
BM: Uhm.
RK: And I also believe that Meachum uses the language "justifiable expectation rooted in state law or practice," and I
think we can look to a series of cases that establish that,
though not constitutionally mandated, Virginia has followed a practice of giving pre-transfer hearings, whether
or not it has to do with reclassification.
BM: Are you referring to hearings prior to this regulation?
RK: Yes.
BM: Because if you wanted to establish a pattern you would
have to say that these cases [referring to other transfer
cases pending in RK's office] relate to various transfer
cases since October, 1979. There were in fact no transfer hearings for these five prisoners, who were transferred from lesser to greater security prisons. And if
they are pursuant to that regulation, then it would suggest that the pattern of practice is that there are no
hearings.
RK: I think what that suggests is that we have a class action
on our hands. It is the practice in Virginia. We can,

1985]

ARGUMENT IN LEGAL DISPUTE-NEGOTIATION

15)

BM:

16)

RK:

17)
18)
19)

BM:
RK:
BM:

20)

RK:

21)
22)

BM:
RK:

23)
24)
25)

BM:
RK:
BM:

26)
27)
28)

RK:
BM:
RK:

29)
30)
31)

BM:
RK:
BM:

32)

RK:

33)

BM:
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Lamb v. Hutto establishes that. In fact Meachum makes no
distinction between state law; it doesn't say state law
only, it says state law or practice; in fact, we have had a
practice or. a history of that happening. I think that
clearly puts us within the Meachum rule. Let me see if I
can . . .
Lamb v. Hutto, you have to remember, came out probably after the...
No, in fact, Lamb v. Hutto came out before. Lamb v. Hutto
came out March 29, 1979.
And when were the incidents?
October. October 26, 1979.
Nevertheless, Lamb v. Hutto is based on prior regulations
which I, you know, being that I can't get ahold of all the
regulations, I am presuming that that was overruled by
this regulation.
Okay, I know it could be, may not be, but really doesn't
meet the question.
So it's not authoritative on this particular regulation.
Well, it's not authoritative as far as the state law branch
of Meachum goes, but it is authoritative as far as the state
practice in Meachum goes. Let me show you where it says
that.
I know what you are talking about.
Okay. So, ...
It does basically depend and makes itself verbally depend upon reliance on "published institutional regulations which are the equivalent of a justifiable
expectation in state law."
Okay, you're talking about Lamb v. Hutto.
Yes.
Okay, certainly, certainly so, but that's still practice
right?
No.
Do they still do it?
Practice based on regulations, yes. But not practice independent of. ..
Well, could have been, could have been. I'll tell you, the
question is whether there was a practice and I don't
think there is any way you can refute that there was practice, that they've done it.
Well, obviously they didn't do it in the case of Lerch. So
they don't always do it.
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Well, that's why we're here. That's exactly why we're
here.
So it's not necessarily their established practice. I don't
have facts to the effect that they do it 50% of the time.
Well I have a district court case. It's called Peterson v.
Davis, that says, that acknowledges that it is the practice.
Peterson v. Davis goes against you.
Well nevertheless, it still acknowledges that there was a
practice of pre-transfer hearings.
Right, but it doesn't require it.
That's not the question. The question is whether there's
a practice, right?
No. The question is whether it is constitutionally
required.
No. That has nothing to do with it. The way the analysis
goes is, it is not constitutionally required. I won't argue
that, but if there is, if the state gives the prisoner any
reason to think that he is going to have a hearing, then it
is constitutionally required.
Well, that's what I'm saying.
Okay, okay.
But, whether there is a practice such that it is constitutionally required is the issue, and I think it is a factual
question whether there's a practice, it's a factual question whether there's a regulation which we can determine now. A factual question for a jury or a judge
whether or not there was a practice.
I think, well...
Whether there is an established practice that would give
the defendant the expectation that he had a right to the
hearing. I think there is in fact a case that says that.
Uhm. Where's that cite?
[pause]
It is a factual question. Unrefutable really.
[Reading from Wolff] "Since prisoners in Nebraska can
only lose good time credits if they are guilty of serious
misconduct, the determination of whether such behavior
has occurred becomes critical, and requires procedural
due process appropriate to the circumstances."
I don't understand what you are saying.
Okay, so what I'm saying is that when you have a regulation such as this, or you have a practice on which a pris-
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oner can base a justifiable expectation of having a
hearing . . .
But what is a justifiable expectation but a factual
question?
Well I think it has been decided as a matter of law many
times, but even...
Not a practice.
Even if it is.
A regulation yes, not a practice.
I think we've got it on either count. Anyway...
You're basing your argument on either a practice prior
to this regulation, which is a factual issue as far as I see
it, or on this regulation, which in fact exists. I will certainly admit that.
Okay.
Which came out after the Lamb decision, which is the
only authoritative, .

.

. speaking to this issue.

I don't think so. I think, as we acknowledged a minute
ago, that Peterson v. Davis has a lot to say about it. And
we're going to take this thing to the district court here,
and we have already got a district court judge who said
that, who has admitted it's Virginia practice, to have a
transfer hearing. I really don't
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.

. .

think we are spend-

ing a lot of time on this. We probably should move on.
Have we come to any agreement on it? I feel like we've
got a pretty good case.
BM: Well I don't feel like we have come to an agreement. I
feel like you have a case and I have a case.
RK: What's your case now? I'm sorry.
BM: My case is that there is at least for the purposes of today's discussion, you cannot make the assumption that
there is a pattern or practice established that will justify
the defendant's expectation that he has a constitutional
right to a hearing.
RK: Okay, ah...
BM: Because it's a factual issue. My second point is that it is
unclear what effect that regulation has on the Director
and his discretionary power. And my third point is that
Lamb v. Hutto does not control any interpretation of that
regulation. And I'm not saying. ..
RK: According to the law . . .
BM: I'm not saying yes you're wrong and I'm right. Absolutely not, don't get me wrong.

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

70)
71)

RK:
BM:

72)

RK:

[VOL. 44:65

Yeah.
All I'm saying is that it is unclear that in a court of law it
would clearly come out that your case was persuasive.
I think given the drift of the district courts, the Fourth
Circuit and the Supreme Court, I just, I just, I really
don't feel like there's any question. I think that I have
given you a reasonable explanation why there is no
question.

These arguments lack detail and multidimensionality, but their
biggest failing is lack of structure and organization. The due process issue is intertwined with related issues, and the parties hop to
and from these issues in serendipitous fashion, not always clear
about which issue they are discussing. Many arguments are raised,
but they are not pursued beyond one or two statements, and no
conclusions, even tentative, are reached. As they shift from topic to
topic, the parties add new points, sometimes from new dimensions.
At first, this makes their arguments appear multidimensional and
cumulative. But the arguments are just numerous, not cumulative,
and multidimensionality without detail produces just another form
of superficiality.
The negotiators' inarticulateness,8 4 when combined with their
different agendas, adds to the confusion. From different conceptions of the due process issue, each listens to the other through filters, interpreting what is said as a response to his own argument.
Because these conceptions are not radically different and because
the comments are vague, many comments could be taken as responsive, and there are periodic statements of ostensible agreement.
But, in fact, the two pass one another continually, approaching but
never interlocking. They probably realize that this is happening, yet
neither attempts to diagnose and remove the confusion. 85 Again,
particular examples will illustrate these general points.
RK's opening emphasizes the content of the due process protections (notice, a hearing, right to present evidence and cross-examination, explanation of the decision) rather than the threshold
84. The excerpts are literal transcriptions, with punctuation placed as it seemed appropriate based on the speakers' cadence, pace, and tone. Throughout, they are ungrammatical and inarticulate, but in reviewing the tapes, participants were not bothered
by this. Almost always, they "knew" what the adversary wanted to say, and edited his
remarks toward that end, sometimes correctly. Inarticulateness is a weakness in the
arguments, listener compensation notwithstanding.
85. Compare the behavior of FM at infra p. 118, statement (86) (acknowledging

confusion).
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question of whether the clause applies, though he does not ignore
the latter altogether (10). If this opening suggests that the threshold question is nondebatable, it lacks balance. On the other hand, if
it indicates that the threshold question is the easier of the two, it is
probably wrong, but it could help RK define a favorable agenda.8 6
The central issue in the excerpt has to do with the negotiators'
different conceptions of the due process question. RK argues that
Virginia has a practice of providing a hearing, and that this is the
legally significant factor. BM counters that Virginia does not have a
regulation providing for a hearing, and that this is the legally significant factor (33-38). RK is clearer than BM, but the latter's point
seems implicit in the totality of his remarks. The discussion that
follows reflects these two different conceptions, but does not articulate them. The ensuing confusion is neither acknowledged nor resolved. The negotiators seem locked into different agendas and are
not articulate at identifying the differences." It is certainly possible
to discuss the question of whether a practice or a regulation is the
legally significant factor. But to discover that this is the question is a
necessary first step and the negotiators do not take it.
The exchange about Meachum has an additional weakness. RK's
use of Meachum rests on an incorrect reading of the case. He refers
to Meachum three times, saying first, that "he believes that" Meachum
uses the "rooted in state . . . practice" language (10), second that
"in fact," Meachum uses it (14), and finally, that he will show BM
where in Meachum the language appears (22), but BM does not accept the offer. More interestingly, BM seems to agree with RK's
summary of Meachum (23) although this agreement clearly is not in
BM's best interest. This is good for RK, as Meachum speaks only of
"roots in state law," and the term "practice" does not appear any-

86. Another tactical move appears in RK's discussion of the facts. RK personalizes
Lerch's story by arguing from the circumstances of the transfer ("awakened at 5:00 in
the morning and taken way across the state") and is one of the few negotiators to do so.
He is not likely to convince BM on this point as these items are excessively hypothetical
in a simulation. But by adding a personal dimension, he rounds out his argument and,
perhaps, if only subliminally, makes it appear more complete.
87. This type of confusion is common, and when it occurs the typical response is to
change the subject. Parties act as if the topic, and not they, produced the confusion.

Often, the new discussion becomes confused and the topic is changed again. Sometimes
whole negotiations consist of little more than one confusing, abandoned discussion after
another. Each participant usually comes out of such a meeting calling the adversary
unprepared, unintelligent, and irrational, and the transcript usually reads as above.
Non-consensual definition of the issue is regularly associated with bad argument. See S.
BACHARACH & E. LAWLER, supra note 6, at 164.
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where in the opinion. 8 It is possible that RK has deliberately misstated the Meachum language, but knowing him, one would think this
is unlikely. It is hard to imagine that both negotiators failed to read
Meachum, and that each missed so crucial a point as the distinction
between a practice and a regulation, but it is also hard to explain
their discussion of Meachum in any other way.
There is a similar weakness in RK's argument that the new
transfer regulation repeals the regulation relied on in Lamb, and
thus makes Lamb beside the point (19). He does not say that this
repeal must be by implication, or discuss the elements of the doctrine of implied repeal. He may not know of the doctrine, or may
not have expected to argue it, but, if so, this would be surprising.
Along with the argument that a practice does not create an expectation,89 and the argument that the new transfer regulation does not
provide for a hearing, the implied repeal argument is an essential
element of RK's best theory for arguing the case.
One final point emerges. BM and RK may not have the same
understanding of the objectives of good argument. BM seems more
equivocal, less certain, and more conciliatory than RK. He sometimes makes RK's arguments for him, and acknowledges that there
is something to them (59). By his own admission he does not believe that RK is wrong, and that he is right (69), or that RK would
lose in court and that he would win (71). At first, this might look
like balance, that BM sees reasonable positions on both sides,
notwithstanding that he thinks that his own view is correct. But in
context, these qualities could also express a desire for a draw, in
which each side admits that the other has a case (63), ("there are
cases on both sides"), and agrees to divide the stakes evenly. BM
may view argument as a dance toward the middle rather than an
analysis of rights and obligations, but if so, this attitude is confusing.
His reading of Lamb is as sophisticated and perhaps more so than
RK's, and he raises (if he does not develop) a larger number of arguments. He has more reason to hold firm.
The source of the weaknesses in this exchange is difficult to
trace. In their failure to identify the existence and causes of their
confusion, their blatantly mistaken understandings of Meachum, and
RK's seeming unawareness of the implied repeal doctrine, the nego88. Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593, 599-603 (1972), establishes the point that a
practice can create an expectation to procedural due process.
89. BM makes the argument that a practice does not create an expectation (see, e.g.,
statements 25-32, and see 31 in particular), but perhaps not clearly enough for RK to
understand (see, e.g., statement 28).
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tiators evidence a confusion and ignorance usually associated with
lack of basic ability or inadequate preparation. Yet neither of these
negotiators lacked ability, and both had prepared for the
negotiation.
C.

MWv. FM

This excerpt starts five minutes after the negotiation opens, and
concludes twenty minutes later. While it is more than twice as long
as either excerpt one or two, it is the easiest of the three to read.
Issues are raised in a somewhat logical sequence, moving from the
most comprehensive to the most specific; most comments are on
point; and each stage of the discussion usually grows logically out of
the stage that precedes it. The excerpt is an example of good argument, at least as good as argument gets on the Lerch tapes. While
not without weaknesses, (e.g. there is considerable inarticulateness
and organizational confusion, but unlike before, these properties do
not prevent the negotiators from analyzing the transfer regulation
and case law in some detail), the argument is "in-depth" in an imperfect but real sense of that term. Argument of this type occurs
about twenty percent of the time on the Lerch tapes, but appears on
only about ten percent of the tapes. FM represents Lerch and MW
represents McDane.
1)
2)
3)
4)

MW:
FM:
MW:
FM:

5)

MW:

6)
7)
8)

FM:
MW:
FM:

Okay, well, .
First of all, starting with due process rights, .
Okay.
I am sure you are aware of the Meachum case. All
right? Which says that, only where, only that where a
statute gives complete discretion to prison officials to
transfer, is it true that no due process rights attach.
And under this case the regulation ...
Well, let me just draw your attention to the statute in
Virginia, Section 53-19.17. "The Director is authorized to transfer or to be transferred any person accused or convicted of an offense against the laws of
the Commonwealth of Virginia, or of any state or
country," blah, blah, blah. There is no statutory limit
on the. ..
No, that's not true.
Authority of the Director to transfer.
Oh, that's not true. The very regulation which you
guys promulgated last March reads that "no prisoner
shall be assigned to any institution if such assignment
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will impair ongoing rehabilitation, prevent adequate
medical treatment, or result in a prisoner's incarceration with inmates whose offenses are much more serious than his own, unless such reassignment is absolutely necessary for the protection of any inmate or
the security of any institution."
And how do you, what's your basis for claiming that
that regulation invokes the due process protection for
the prisoner in this case?
Well, the Meachum case clearly says that where there is
a state law or practice, here, let me get out the
Meachum case, where there is a state law or a practice
which creates a legally protected liberty interest, expectation to the liberty interest...
What liberty interest are we talking about?
Liberty interest, meaning the interest in not being
transferred to a maximum security prison without a
hearing. And Meachum requires that where there is a
state law or a state practice, and state regulation in
this case, which creates a legally protected expectation
that you won't be transferred without some sort of serious misconduct or other occurrence ...
But where is the requirement of serious misconduct in
this regulation?
Well, first of all the . . .
On what actions of the prisoner is the authority of the
Director to transfer Lerch in this case dependent,
that's comparable to the standard which invoked a
hearing under such cases as Wolff or Morrissey.
Well, the idea of both Meachum and Wolff is that where
the transfer is punitive in nature then a due process
hearing is required.
I think . . . I am willing to listen to you. And I am not
trying to be argumentative, but I think what's clear
from both Meachum and Haymes was that the transfers
were inevitably punitive in nature. That the conduct
of the prisoner was constantly taken into account . ..
Here's the precise language.
"You recognize that the prisoner's behavior influences the transfer decision and that allegations of conduct may be erroneous. Therefore, although the comments would have been proof for other circumstances,
therefore, although in other disciplinary actions a
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hearing would have been required for these kinds of
punitive measures, there is no comparable liberty interest in which prison a prisoner is assigned to and the
Director within his discretion can transfer." That was
a holding in Meachum. Now . . .
In Meachum, Meachum quoted Wolff v. McDonnell:
"Since the prisoners in Nebraska can only lose good
time credits if they are guilty of serious misconduct,
the determination of whether such behavior has occurred becomes critical, and a minimum requirement
of procedural due process appropriate to the circum-
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MW:

Exactly, that's my point.
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FM:

" . . . to the circumstances must be observed."
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MW:
FM:
MW:

stances .
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29)
30)

31)

32)
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."

That's my point.
And this regulation created that expectation.
This regulation is not dependent on identifiable misconduct of the prisoner. And let me draw your attention to two cases...
FM:
Well, look, look, wait a minute . . .
MW: Have you read the case?
FM:
More happened than just the transfer, right? Also,
good time credits were revoked. I call your attention
to the statute, hold on a second,
MW: I've got it here.
FM:
It's 53-2.14, where it says "any jail prisoner or convict
under the control of the Director, who violates or who
has violated any jail or prison rule or regulation, shall
forfeit such portion of his accumulated credit for good
conduct as may be deemed proper by the Director."
Now that is clearly punitive in nature.
MW: Okay, what you haven't, what you have overlooked is
that there has been no forfeiture of good time credits
in this case.
FM:
Let me just ask you one question. How much is it
worth to you to litigate this question, to determine
once and for all, to get a judicial determination as to
whether this regulation creates a legally protected expectation not to be transferred absent, according to
Meachum, serious misconduct or other occurrences? I
mean, I think you will recognize that this regulation
was only promulgated to get around the whole reclassification hearing requirement, the ICC [Institutional
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Classification Committee] reclassification hearing requirement. This is a blatant attempt to try to circumvent that. There hasn't been any judicial determination. The Legal Aid Society would just love nothing
better than a case like this, which involves the transfer
from a minimum security to a maximum security, and
most importantly in our case, the fact that our prisoner, our client, was not given any medical treatment for
his heroin addiction in a maximum security prison. I
think that the Society would like nothing better than
to have a case as egregious as that to test this regulation.
Well, you know, I can't prevent you from bringing
any case you want to bring. If you want to talk about
prisoner Lerch, we can talk about prisoner Lerch.
When we are talking about Lerch, you've got to show
that, you've got to show me a violation and you have
to show me, you've, in addition to the damages which
Let me refer you to the case of Lamb v. Hutto in, .
which was decided by the Eastern District. You realize
in that case the court held that, that, and I quote "on
the other hand, however, if an inmate can establish
that a justifiable expectation of a pre-transfer hearing
is rooted in state law then the general rule does not
apply. A due process right arguably has been created.
In Virginia, although not constitutionally required, it
appears to be standard practice that pre-transfer hearings conducted according to published procedural
standards are afforded inmates who are about to be
reclassified or transferred to a higher security level.
The court concludes, therefore, that reliance upon
these published regulations is the equivalent of ajustifiable expectation."
Well, obviously, the regulation in question that's effective in Virginia now was not the regulation that was
considered by the Lamb v. Hutto court.
Precisely, there are two regulations.
In addition, the Lamb v. Hutto court is a, it's not binding and it's inconsistent with the, it says essentially no
more . . .
They're dealing with the same regulations. It's the
same state.
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It says...
Well, the point is, let's make sure we both understand
each other. There are two regulations, granted. The
first deals with an ICC engaging in a reclassification
and transfer, and the published regulations say that
where reclassification and retransfer are involved, the
hearing is required. When only reclassification is involved, no hearing is required, but when reclassification and transfer is required, a hearing is required.
Do you have a copy of that regulation?
Yeah, I sure do. But that's the first regulation. And
the second regulation is the one in question, which we
would like nothing better than to test in court.
Is this regulation in the record?
No, they're published ICC regulations. [Pause] And
so therefore, the ICC at least draws a distinction between mere reclassification and reclassification and
transfer. When a transfer is involved in a reclassification procedure, a hearing is required and that's mandated by the regulation. Now this regulation is a blatant attempt to get around that. It ought to be tested.
Let me say, let me say, the response to the Meachum
opinion and the, you know, there has been a change in
the regulations in early 1979, that you might not be
aware of, and under the new classification regulations
of the Virginia Department of Corrections, transfer
hearings are specifically exempted from the purview
of the hearings of the Reclassification Committee.
Admittedly, admittedly. I'm saying that clearly this
regulation is, you know, is separate ...
No, no, no, no, no.
And . . .
This is a regulation that says that transfer decisions
Ahuh.
Are excepted, are excluded from the reclassification
committee's . ..
From this committee.
From that committee. Right.
As of what date?
As of early 1979.
All right, that's precisely the issue I was trying to drive
home. The fact that prior to that regulation this was
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the system, okay, where a transfer required a hearing
and reclassification did not. A transfer required a
hearing. Now this is an attempt to get around that
somehow, but it still is not good enough.
No, no, no. This is an attempt to change the expectation of a hearing, upon any transfer decision in the
State of Virginia, and the thing is that, see what
you're, if you're pressing to handcuff these Department of Corrections people in terms of their ability to
manage their prison population, the Greenholtz court
warns against this. They say if we introduce too much
procedural impedimenta to the ability of the Department of Corrections to grant parole releases,
.

.

.

I think we can argue forever about whether this

regulation creates a legally protected expectation.
Okay.
And that's the issue that we would be litigating, obviously, whether this statute does in fact create the same
kind of interest that this statute, that this regulation
created. And you know we would argue and I think a
court would accept it that this is essentially the same
thing.
Well, I think that the thing is, is that what you, I think
that you are minimizing the importance of the Greenholtz distinction between, the thing about, the common factor that went through Wolff and Morrissey, that
wasn't present in Greenholtz and in Meachum, was that
in Wolff and Morrissey the statute gave specific conduct
of the prisoner which resulted in revocation of.

.

. in

other words you can look, you can look and see what
this prisoner . . . you can have a hearing on some-

thing, you can look and you can see whether this prisoner did something that required some action. Okay,
that came within the purview of the state, or that
didn't. But in broader administrative areas, the kind
of hearing that you have on the security of the prison
are . . . you . . . it's not dependent on the specific

conduct of a particular prisoner. In other words,
there is nothing you can say that he did or didn't do.
It involves a host of other factors which aren't, which
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can't be confined to an adversary proceeding with one
particular prisoner.
FM: All right, all right. I think we are arriving at something here. I mean, the point is, whether this language, "unless such reassignment is absolutely necessary for the protection of any inmate or the security of
any institution," is analogous, tantamount to the same
thing as the language in the statute in Wolff and in
Morrissey which required serious misconduct.
MW: And that's precisely, that's why I'm talking about
Greenholtz.
FM: All right. To determine whether reassignment is absolutely necessary for the protection of the inmate or
the security of the institution, implicit is a requirement
that they find that that inmate did something.
MW: No. No. The thing is...
Is guilty of serious misconduct.
FM:
MW: No. No. It's not at all. It's not, see. . . I have to go
to the library and get the Greenholtz opinion for you
because I'm trying. . . The distinction is the distincall right? . . . between the types
tion that matters
of. . . it's not dependent upon specific misconduct.
It's a, let me read to you the, well ...
I'm talking about the common sense interpretation of
FM:
the language of this statute, which is after all what a
court will have to do.
MW: The common sense interpretation of the language.
FM: What are the specific charges, first of all, that prisoner
Lerch is accused of committing? Why was he transferred?
MW: We haven't...
FM: Just some sort of a vague, amorphous, you know, to
protect the security of the institution? It has to be
something more specific than that.
MW: Prisoner Lerch was interfering with the drug rehabilitation program, and in the opinion of the Director,
based on his record, based on information in that file,
he was a security risk.
In other words he was being accused of misconduct.
FM:
That he had interfered with the rehabilitation program. You just said it.
MW: Yeah, but see, the thing is that . . . That's what the
court in Meachum . . .
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That's why he was transferred.
The court in Meachum and in Haymes, both say that the
fact that the transfer results from disciplinary purposes, or that arises out of misconduct, does not give
the transferee the procedural protection that he
would, it does not invoke a due process hearing.
Show me where they say that.
Okay.
Where's the case?
Yeah, I've got it right here. I'll show you where they
say that.
They say precisely the opposite. What happened to
Meachum, in Meachum there was a statute which gave
the Director of Corrections complete discretion to
transfer whenever he wanted. Here's the statute in
Massachusetts. It says "the Commissioner may transfer any sentenced prisoner from one institution to another and with the approval of the sheriff, except a
prisoner serving a life sentence" blah, blah, blah, or
for any, in other words it doesn't condition the transfer upon any serious misconduct.
Haymes said that. Haymes. The court, the holding was
narrower than in Meachum. In Haymes, the court below
held that in disciplinary transfers having substantial
adverse impact on the prisoners who were [transferred] called for procedural formalities, and the court
said that Meachum required overruling the Court of
Appeals decision. You know, I've got, I've excerpted
the pertinent language here from Meachum and I can't
just turn to it quickly, but it said that ...
All right, listen.
All right.
I think we can settle this, but we've got to listen to
each other, and I'm probably just as guilty of it as you
are at the moment, but somehow we are like ships
passing in the night. Now tell me if this interpretation
of Meachum is not correct. In Meachum there is a statute, Massachusetts statute, which gives complete discretion to the Director of Corrections to transfer prisoners whenever he wanted.
Essentially.
Here's the statute. Okay.
Right.
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100)

Meachum said, under those circumstances no hearing
is required. Right? And it distinguished Wolff v. McDonnell because in Wolff v. McDonnell . . .
I understand.
Guilty of serious misconduct.
It's statutory...
So that's the distinction. Now we've come to this regulation, we have to determine whether that regulation

Does not talk about serious misconduct.
Sure, but implicit in a finding of inmate, protection of
the inmate or the security of any institution, implicit in
that is got to be a finding that he's guilty of some misconduct.
MW: Haymes overruled, I mean Haymes was a narrower case.
Haymes only dealt with disciplinary transfers. They said there is no procedural right in disciplinary transfers, but even in Meachum, which was the broader injunction, they say a prisoner's behavior may precipitate a transfer. Absent such behavior, perhaps transfer would not take place at all. But as we've said, Massachusetts prison officials have the discretion to transfer. Their discretion is not limited to serious misconduct.
FM:
Right, right. Which is precisely the point I just made.
There's no restriction at all.
MW: Yeah. But any power to transfer. Above, they say
"that an inmate's conduct in general or in specific instances may often be a major factor in the decision of
prison officials to transfer him, is to be expected unless it be assumed that transfers are mindless events.
A prisoner's past and anticipated future behavior will
very likely be taken into account." And if Haymes is
the narrower case, where the Court of Appeals had
only required transfers for disciplinary purposes...
And the Supreme Court said the transfers for disciplinary purposes do not invoke due process protection.
FM:
Well, look, at least we have zeroed in on what the conflict between us is, and that's the interpretation of that
clause.

101)

MW:

Well, I think . .

102)
103)

FM:
MW:

That's something we have to argue to a court.
Well, let's move on then.

120
104)
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O.K.

With an occasional frolic and detour, this discussion follows
Lerch's due process claim from beginning to end as a single, continuous thread. With its singleminded emphasis on rule, the discussion lacks multidimensionality, but in other respects it is superior to
the preceding excerpts. In its qualities of detail, balance, emphasis,
and cumulation, it is as good as any on the Lerch tapes, though still
short of what one ideally might hope for. The argument focuses on
the important sources of authoritative law (i.e., the transfer regulation, Meachum, and the Virginia prison system enabling act); quotes
rather than paraphrases case and statutory language; grounds positions in correct legal concepts (e.g., "liberty" interest, "punitive
transfer," "justifiable expectation rooted in state law," "reclassification and transfer," "specific or serious misconduct," and "disciplinary transfer"); and moves logically from simple to complex levels
of analysis. Overall, these patterns produce a large amount of detail, which builds on itself and causes the arguments to appear
somewhat sophisticated. These characteristics are present from the
earliest moments of the negotiation, indicating that the parties view
detailed legal analysis as an integral part of bargaining. Differences
between this and the other excerpts are ones of degree, but this degree is measurable. Again, examples will illustrate.
The negotiators open with a discussion of Meachum and the liberty interest concept, and for the first time in these excerpts, discuss
these topics extensively and in a sophisticated fashion. In due
course, the discussion shifts to Lamb, which is summarized by a quotation that includes the qualification that the plaintiff's expectation
to a hearing was based on "published regulations" (34). This move
in the discussion from one major case to the other is mirrored in a
shift from the concept of "liberty interest" to that of "expectation
rooted in state law" (34). Each of these features shows more logical
order, attention to detail, and balance than do equivalent features of
the prior excerpts.
The analysis is not always exemplary. FM's theory of attack on
the new transfer regulation-that it is a "blatant attempt to get
around [the Lamb] regulation" (44)-may indicate that he understands the problem as one of reconciling contradictory regulations,
but does not show that he has an argument for how that reconciliation ought to be done. At this point he has spotted the issue, but no
more. Similarly, MW's rejoinder, that the new regulation was intended to exempt transfers from the purview of the reclassification
committee (45, 49, 51), may be an argument that Virginia has re-
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pealed all expectations to a hearing, but if so, it is not put in those
terms, or linked, as it must be, to the concept of implied repeal.
These are failings of detail. In addition, the rejoinder is made
before confusion about the topic on the table is removed, and this is
a weakness in emphasis.
Despite these weaknesses, the negotiators reach agreement on
the relevant question: Does the new transfer regulation replace or
supplement the regulation interpreted in Lamb? This question
could be discussed. For example, what does it mean to try to "get
around" (56) an earlier regulation? Is that, by definition, to repeal
it; or, since implied repeal is disfavored, is more explicit evidence of
intent required? The parties do not ask these questions or pursue
the topic further. MW introduces a prison "supervision" argument,
the conversation goes off in that direction (57), and again, the discussion stops at the moment that it might have begun. As before,
detail is the missing element.
After an aside about Greenholtz (omitted), FM analogizes the
Lerch transfer regulation to the Wolff regulation discussed in
Meachum (58-76). Interpreting Wolff, Meachum held that a transfer
conditioned on "serious misconduct" must be preceded by a hearing. The Lerch regulation does not refer to "misconduct" but it conditions reassignment on a finding of "absolutely necessary for the
protection of any inmate or the security of any institution" (64). FM
argues that this is the equivalent of a misconduct finding and that
Meachum controls. As framed initially, the argument is overly
broad,9" but FM narrows it (70, 72, 74, 76). The argument has
weaknesses, but it is inventive and requires an answer. Analogy is
an important dimension of argument, perhaps the most powerful
with lawyers, and not used enough in these excerpts. This is as
good an analogy, with all of its lack of development, as the Lerch
negotiators made.
MW responds to this argument by asserting that a transfer's
tangential connection to prisoner misbehavior does not trigger due
process protections. MW probably understands FM's argument, but
his rejoinder is slightly unresponsive (77). If he means that a temporal connection between Lerch's misbehavior and his transfer is
not the same as a causal connection, and that the latter is requiredthough by itself not enough-he could say that more clearly. Incon90. For example, if Lerch testifies against another inmate in court or in a disciplinary
hearing, and the inmate then vows to kill Lerch, under the "absolutely necessary" standard, Lerch presumably may be transferred for his own protection, even though he has
not engaged in serious misconduct.
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clusive discussion rounds out the treatment of this topic (78-83),
and another potentially interesting question is left unexplored.
Intertwined with the "serious misconduct" discussion is another potentially fruitful argument based on Wolff and Morrissey.
MW describes a spectrum of transfer regulations defined on one
end by regulations using the "serious misconduct" standard (Wolff
and Morrissey) and on the other by regulations that do not (Meachum
and Greenholtz) (61), and suggests that the difference between these
regulations is the difference between disciplinary and administrative
action. The former requires a hearing, and the latter does not (61).
Mentioned but not discussed in Meachum, the administrative-disciplinary dichotomy had produced a split in the circuits, 9 ' and thus,
could have provided considerable grist for analysis. 9 2 But this topic
also is left unexplored. In addition, intertwining the argument with
the analogy to Meachum detracts from MW's organization, and raises
the risk of having one or both of the arguments go unrecognized.
By the end of the excerpt the number of arguments advanced
begins to take its toll. Attention and responsiveness decline precipitously, as FM acknowledges when he comments that they "are like
ships passing in the night" (86). This attempt to reduce confusion is
laudable and is notably absent in other Lerch negotiations. The
negotiators may be approaching the end of prepared arguments,
where the incompatibility of their positions is most apparent. Acknowledging confusion and changing the topic may be a neutral
means for backing away from impasse and keeping the bargaining
on track.9 3 If this was what was intended, this exchange evidences a
higher than average tolerance for detail, and a sufficiently balanced
perspective to know that there is more to be said for both sides.
In many respects this excerpt is the opposite of the first. In fact,
these two excerpts together define a spectrum on which most of the
Lerch arguments may be located. In the last excerpt, issues are defined jointly, legal concepts are applied in good faith, case law is
confronted honestly, and paralyzing impasse is delayed. Most issues
are examined at multiple levels, arguments often build cumulatively

91. See, e.g., Gomes v. Travisono, 510 F.2d 537, 541 (lst Cir. 1974), modifying and
aft'g, 490 F.2d 1209 (lst Cir. 1973) (procedures may be required whether transfer is
administrative or punitive). But see Bryant v. Hardy, 488 F.2d 72, 74 (4th Cir. 1973)
(minimum procedures need only accompany disciplinary transfers).
92. See Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 222 n.6 (1976).
93. Compare with this tactic Bobbitt, supra note 16, at 725-26 (discussion of how
different constitutional arguments "seem to pass each other without quite engaging"
and how one "can continue a particular line of... [argument] despite what appears to
be crushing criticism ....
").
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and respond to adversary positions, and, in spite of its complexity,
the discussion maintains remarkably good order. There is even an
attempt to stand outside the negotiation and self-consciously acknowledge unresolved conflict. All of this could be done better, but
more than most Lerch excerpts, this discussion approaches and
sometimes reaches the level of in-depth, rational analysis.
D.

The Lerch Arguments in General

As a group, the Lerch arguments have few of the qualities described in section III. Their biggest failing is a lack of detail. Some
are better than others in this regard, but none is excellent, and perhaps only the third excerpt is adequate. Arguments are identified,
or labelled, but not developed. Little of the problem's background
factual material about Lerch's behavior, prison system practices, or
treatment of prisoners in similar situations is used. The richness of
the case law is largely ignored, and the intricacies of the confusing,
redundant, and sometimes contradictory Virginia prison transfer
regulations are not carefully examined.
The arguments are also unidimensional. They deal principally
with the elaboration of rules, to the exclusion of analogy, policy,
principle, and consequences. A certain amount of unidimensionality was expected. The problem's time limit, the complexity of its
rule questions, the comparatively more hypothetical nature of policy
and consequences arguments in a setting that emphasizes doctrinal
analysis, together encouraged discussion of the rule aspects of the
due process issue. But arguments based on analogy, consequences,
and policy are also familiar domain to law trained people, and even
in a simulation exercise, they should have been more prominent.
Rarely do parts of arguments build cumulatively on themselves.
More often, they are unconnected and isolated episodes, arranged
in sequences that are random as much as developmental. Again,
there are exceptions. In the third excerpt, the negotiators start
from broad foundational questions and narrow, conceptually and
factually, to questions tailored individually to Lerch. But this is unusual. Most Lerch negotiators seem to have a predetermined set of
substantive points to make, an idea about where to begin, and a general strategy of "playing-it-by-ear" after that. If an argument builds
cumulatively, it does so as a matter of fortuity rather than design.
With few exceptions, the arguments show little balance. DE's
behavior in the first excerpt is the most serious offender, but only
BM in the second excerpt seems to believe that there is merit on
both sides. Stylistically, the negotiators are cordial. Save for the
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first excerpt, there is little ad hominem, rejection of positions out of
hand, "non-negotiable" position-taking, hyperbole, wrapped-in-theflag language, or parades of horribles, and the absence of these factors contributes to a tone that might be called balanced. But at the
level of substance, there is little to indicate that the bargainers view
the legal questions as close, or their adversaries' arguments as having merit.
The arguments are not subtle, though they are often elliptical,
and sometimes this may reflect a conscious decision to encourage
the adversary to join in. But this ellipticality produces confusion
more often than bilateral analysis, and the adversary is not so frequently engaged as misled. Evidence of this, particularly in the
form of talking past one another, is abundant and suggests the need
for more detailed development of the arguments. Yet rarely is this
suggestion taken. This may indicate that the ellipticity proceeds
more often from an incomplete substantive understanding than
from a strategic judgment to engage the adversary
enthymematically.
The arguments are poorly organized and arranged. Major
parts of most excerpts are characterized by conflicting agendas,
rapid topic shifts, random issue spotting, and the lack of explicit
structure. In these segments emphasis is weak or nonexistent. In
fact, the bargainers add little to the natural emphases inevitable in
ordinary conversation.
Written transcripts provide little data about an argument's
emotionality, and this is unfortunate. The exchanges are rich in
tone, pace, expression, and mannerisms. Particularly in the first excerpt, but to a significant degree in the others as well, the bargainers
shout, plead, grimace, smirk, sulk, scowl, frown, and otherwise
travel back and forth on a wide emotional spectrum. Unfortunately,
much of this emotion reflects an assessment of competitive position,
such as anxiety when an argument is rejected or smugness when an
adversary is unable to respond, rather than conviction in or doubt
about an argument. Thus the emotionality does little to establish
the trustworthiness of corresponding substantive statements. As a
rule, the Lerch negotiators express genuine emotions, but not emotions that bolster their positions.
In addition, the arguments fail because the negotiators seem
not to plan their remarks past opening exchanges, and act as if they
expect the adversary not to respond. They use cases as controlling
precedents rather than conceptual aids to solving analytical dilemmas. They pretend to be knowledgeable when it would be better to
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admit genuine (and often transparent) ignorance. They speak
before they know what they are going to say; they elevate stylized
conflict over differences that are trivial above genuine conflict over
differences that are real. They state complicated positions in soliloquies, rather than in pieces as part of an extended exchange. Much
of what passes for discussion is predetermined position-taking that
could have gone on without an adversary being present, and often
looks as if it did.
Overall, the arguments fail on both the cooperative and competitive levels. They fail cooperatively because they are regularly
irrational, contain little disclosure or open-ended exploration of issues, and show almost no respect for contrary views. True points
are not acknowledged and treated as givens. Factors that make accurate analysis difficult, such as confusion and ambiguity, are allowed to stand, and perhaps are even intentionally produced.
These are not the types of discussions engaged in by persons trying
to solve problems that vex each side.
The arguments fail competitively because they are overstated
and predictable, containing little more than wishful elaborations on
stereotypical positions. It is hard to imagine anyone being surprised
by what he heard and hard to imagine him as intimidated, awed, or
unduly impressed. In making this judgment, a caveat is in order.
Sometimes competitive argument is judged as much by how and to
whom it is delivered as by what it says, and here the transcripts do
not help us. The excerpts reproduce neither the demeanor with
which each argument was delivered nor the personal and social baggage that listeners brought to the negotiations. An intimidating
manner, a fragile psyche, a prior unsuccessful relationship with the
adversary, comparatively lower status and authority in the law
school social world, among other things, could cause negotiators to
defer to arguments that, in their own right, warranted no such respect, and the Lerch arguments could be designed to draw on or trigger these factors. These possibilities notwithstanding, the
arguments are caricatures, and caricatures rarely compete successfully. For the most part, one must conclude that the arguments are
bad, consistently, comprehensively and irredeemably bad.9 4
94. Arguments of this type are perhaps what Derek Bok had in mind in writing his
1981-82 Report to the Harvard Board of Overseers. See generally Bok,A Flawed System, 85
HARV. MAGAZINE

38 (1983). Bok charged that

"Law schools" train their students more for conflict than the gentler arts of
reconciliation and accommodation. This emphasis is likely to serve the profession poorly. . . . Over the next generation, I predict, society's greatest oppor-
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CAUSES AND IMPLICATIONS

The preceding excerpts provide a tentative answer to the question with which the article began. Argument in negotiation rarely
convinces because argument in negotiation is rarely convincing. It
does not persuade because it should not. Questions remain about
whether the Lerch data accurately represent lawyer negotiation,9 5
tunities will lie in tapping human inclinations toward collaboration and
compromise rather than stirring out proclivities for competition and rivalry. If
lawyers are not leaders in marshalling cooperation and designing mechanisms
that allow it to flourish, they will not be at the center of the most creative social
experiments of our time.
Id. at 45. Bok would not ask lawyers to suppress legitimate differences, no doubt, but he
would seem to require, and rightfully so, that they see argument more as a means to
understanding than as a device for achieving power and control. Most of the time, the
Lerch negotiators have these objectives reversed.
95. If the Lerch transcripts are products of the best law students, see supra note 54, it
does not follow that they represent lawyer argument accurately. There are not many
published transcripts of lawyer argument, and those based on simulation exercises have
verisimilitude-reducing features similar to Lerch. See, e.g., J. WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at
17; Rossman, McDonald & Cramer, Some Patterns and Determinants of Plea BargainingDecisions: A Simulation and Quasi-Experiment, in PLEA BARGAINING 77, 79-81 (W. McDonald &J.
Cramer eds. 1980). Published transcripts of actual negotiation are about plea bargaining (a special case), and rarely reproduce arguments in their entirety. See, e.g., A. KRUEGER, THE ORGANIZATION OF INFORMATION IN CRIMINAL LEGAL SETTINGS: A CASE STUDY
OF PROSECUTORIAL DECISION-MAKING IN Los ANGELES 244-80 (1979); L. MATHER, PLEA

BARGAINING OR TRIAL 67-121 (1979); Lloyd, Prosecution Power, ProceduralRights and Pleading Guilty: The Problem of Coercion in Plea BargainingDrug Cases, 26 Soc. PROBS. 452, 465
(1979); Maynard, The Structure of Discourse in Misdemeanor Plea Bargaining, 18 LAw & Soc'Y
REV. 75 (1984).
Three things may be said about the representativeness issue. First, lawyers who
have done the Lerch simulation argue less often than students, but when they argue, they
do so in a nearly identical manner. Persons shown tapes of lawyers and students have
difficulty distinguishing one from the other when obvious features such as age or dress
do not give the answer away. Experienced and elite lawyers argue better than inexperienced and non-elite lawyers, but data for this comparison is so small that any conclusion
is speculative.
Second, generally available instructional videotapes of lawyer negotiation have
argument patterns similar if not identical to those of Lerch. Compare the following exchange from the so-called James negotiation, prepared by the Legal Services Corporation, and perhaps the most venerable of the instructional videotapes used by
negotiation teachers in American law schools. Harris' client (VMB) has sued Stan's client (James) for a deficiency after VMB repossessed James' car. James has defended and
counterclaimed in fraud, negligent misrepresentation, breach of warranty, and related
substantive theories.
Harris: Stan, I want to thank you for coming by today. I thought we'd take a few minutes if we could and chat about this Terry James case we both seem to be involved in. As you know extensive pretrial litigation has not taken place yet and
before that occurs I thought maybe we could discuss the merits of this thing
and maybe come to some kind of a reasonable solution.
Stan:
I'm always agreeable to resolving cases at an early stage. There really is only
one issue though and that is how much your client wants to pay my client
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but to the extent that they do, they suggest that argument plays a
small role in despute-negotiation because that is all it deserves.
A.

Causes

In answering this question about the role of argument, however, a more interesting one is raised. Why would the Lerch participants argue so badly? Most of them were verbally facile, bright, and
well prepared.9 6 When asked to write out their due process argubefore we get this matter into court. This is the type of case, Mr. Harris, that I
like to try and I want to try. I think you know why. When you have someone
ripping off the public as your client has been doing and I'll have no difficulty
establishing fraud in this case. I've got a client who is an indigent gal, whose
husband is an invalid. First of all, I can't understand why you even sued her.
You're not going to collect any money anyway and you know that. And the
counterclaim is as valid a counterclaim as I've ever filed, and you know I've
been successful in the past and I'll be successful in the future. And as emotional as this case is, where you knock a gal out of her job because of selling her
a car which is defective. I'm absolutely convinced we're going to prevail and
we're going to get a substantial judgment of compensatory damages. So really,
the only issue that we can significantly talk about or successfully talk about is
how much your client wants out of this case.
Harris: Well, Stan, let me put it to you like this: If that's the way you want to approach
this discussion, and if you feel that way about it, we're not going to get anywhere in this thing. An associate of yours took the deposition with me here a
couple of days ago, and let me tell you something about your client that you do
not understand, and it's pretty important. If you think we're coming in here
with the big black hat you're very much mistaken. This client . . . you talk
about ripoffl First of all, this client is going to come across as a heavy-handed
lady who has had some problems in the past and all of a sudden figures she's
got a winner here. She's a tough cucumber. She argues, she fights, she
scratches. She's not going to be your indigent little lady in front of the jury
unless you can sandpaper her half to death and, Stan, I don't even think you
can do that. Let me tell you something else. The key to this whole case lies in
that contract, lies in that purchase money security agreement. And . . . I've
dealt with you in the past. This is an old ploy that I've heard you use a million
times before, and that is, throw a red herring in there, jump on it and squeeze
and get as much as you can out of it. She's a high school graduate-she told
you that. She can read and that's where this case lies.
In fairness, the discussion continues for another thirty minutes, but not at a significantly more sophisticated level. Most other instructional tapes are comparable, each
in its own way. See, e.g., the transcripts of negotiation tapes in J. WILLIAMS, supra note
1, at 149-91.
Third, experience in practice and supervising clinical students suggests that lawyer argument is marginally more polished and considerably less diffuse than student
argument, but not good, at least not on a regular basis. It is more impressive when
listened to than when reduced to a transcript and read, and that may account for disagreement with this view. These are impressionistic judgments and obviously inadequate
to support any strong conclusions about patterns in lawyer negotiation argument. Study
of actual lawyer negotiation is obviously needed.
96. See supra note 54. Lack of impressiveness niay be traceable, in part, to a feature
of law classroom dialogue. That dialogue rarely probes deeply. Most students do not
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ments in a brief on the merits or in a pre-negotiation planning
memo,9 7 they made strong arguments with most of the qualities that
their oral exchanges lacked. When asked to articulate characteristics of good argument, they were eloquent and insightful. When
shown tapes of other negotiations in which similar arguments appeared, they identified with ease the patterns they planned to avoid.
They knew what they wanted to do, and what they wanted to avoid,
and yet when face to face with another negotiator they could do
neither.9 8
Two explanations for this failure are most obvious. First, simulations have an irreducible element of gaming, which encourages
participants to "play" at their roles. Instructionally this is a benefit.
Participants are able to discover easily in play lessons that would be
more difficult to grasp if studied directly in work. For research purposes, however, the effects are less sanguine. When participants
play to an audience, they act in accordance with what they take to be
the audience's preferred views, whether they hold such views themselves or not.9 9 Law student perceptions of "audience" beliefs
about negotiation argument appear to be exaggerated and vulgar.
They seem to think that their teachers see negotiation argument as a
variant of moot court, and believe that the best argument is the
loudest, quickest, most certain, and most clever. Argument, in this
have their best thoughts under the gun. The depth of the conversation depends on the
fortuitous event that the student called on is able and prepared. At some point, before
the issue is fully explored, the teacher must break off conversation to tell the rest of the
class where they are and where they have been, because there are always more cases to
be covered, and too few days remaining to cover them. When the teacher decides to
move on, he knows that the discussion has been superficial, but students may not, and
may set their threshold of good analysis at the point class discussion typically reaches.
Students who do substantial writing in law school may develop more sophisticated standards, but most may not lack the ability to make good argument, so much as an understanding of when such argument has been made.
97. Pre-negotiation memos were added as a requirement of the simulation the second and subsequent times it was used. This modification was a response to the patterns
discussed in this Article.
98. This inability suggests that efforts by law schools to assimilate the alternative
dispute-resolution movement and make lawyers the providers and administrators of alternative mechanisms may be premature. Even if successful mediation or arbitration
were solely a matter of technical skill, which it is not, seeJ. AUERBACH, JUSTICE WITHOUT
LAw? RESOLVING DISPUTES WITHOUT LAWYERS 3-17 (1983); Felstiner, Influences of Social
Organizationon Dispute Processing,9 LAw & Soc'v REV. 63 (1974), people who discuss legal
questions in the manner of the Lerch negotiators seem unlikely repositories of that skill.
Without an intervening and radically different educational process, there is some question as to whether lawyers can provide good mediation. It also is not clear that law
school, consistent with its objective to train adversaries, can provide this education.
99. See supra note 54.
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view, is a contest of one-upmanship, control, and harangue, a process partaking more of oratory than of analysis. Success seems to be
seen as producing silence, not learning, and arguing well as never
having to say you are wrong. Some of the overstatement in the Lerch
arguments, therefore, is probably attributable to the fact that the
arguments are simulated and that the participants thought they had
to give a "dramatic" performance. 1"'
The second explanation is to be found in the nature of dispute
negotiation itself. The intrinsic dynamic of face-to-face bargaining
makes it difficult to investigate questions deeply. The process is an
artificially short one, in which a problem is defined and resolved
within a single meeting. Ideas expressed in that meeting are treated
as the relevant universe of information, even when they are recognized as incomplete. Participants must analyze and respond to adversary statements immediately upon their completion, and store
this information for future reference. This becomes particularly difficult in the middle and latter stages of negotiation when large
amounts of information (evidentiary, legal, personal, situational)
have been conveyed. 1 0 ' Moreover, responding to arguments is only
part of one of three equally complex strategic processes going on
simultaneously, 0 2 and this strategic dimension itself is part of a
larger social context. All of this must be done while, to some extent,
maintaining the appearance of not doing it. In some respects, it is
remarkable that negotiation argument is as good as it is.
These structural features of negotiation are dictated by economic and practical considerations or are part of the oral, conversational tradition within which negotiation occurs. They are not likely
to change and negotiation argument must take them into account.
Not so, however, with students beliefs about good argument. These
beliefs are far removed from the standards described in section III,
and need to be changed. Suggestions for reform of legal instruction
are beyond the scope of this article, but one thing seems clear: Negotiation argument should not be taught as a mutated form of moot
court. It is more akin to analysis than oratory, and teaching it as the
latter may insure that it ends up as stylized dance.'
100. This still does not explain why students would hold such beliefs, particularly
since their teachers (the "audience") had rejected them in pre-negotiation discussion.
The beliefs, in part, must stem from something more basic than law school instruction.
101. Cf Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 679-80 (discussion of how momentum of argument
creates new sources of obligation).
102. See supra pp. 67-70.
103. In suggesting that negotiation argument is properly thought of as "analysis," I
do not endorse the idea that dispute-negotiation is always amenable to "objective" and
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Implicationsfor Negotiation Theory

The Lerch arguments also have implications for one prominent
theory about the relationship of negotiation argument to negotiation outcome. This view rejects the perception of negotiation as
"the transmutation of underlying bargaining strength into agreement by the exercise of power, horse-trading, threat, and bluff."' 4
It holds that negotiation is "norm-centered," that it consists of the
-invocation and reasoned elaboration of distinctively legal elements-principles, rules, precedents"-and that these elements
"heavily determine" negotiation outcome." 5 Under this view, when
norms are uncertain and conflicting, elements other than norms
(e.g., prominence, personal force, bargaining leverage, and riskpreference) fix the precise point of settlement. But because these
elements do not begin to operate until norms "have been focused
near their limits of precision," the process is still fundamentally
norm-centered. 0 6 Parties analyze norms until there is nothing left
to be learned from them, and resort to non-normative factors to
reach agreement only if still apart. Lawyers, in particular, negotiate
disputes in this way and in the process, "function as a coupled
unit
'0 7
which is strikingly similar to a formal adjudicative unit."'
The norm-centered view is attractive because it suggests that
private ordering is fundamentally lawful, and that legal education's
pedagogical emphasis on norm invocation and reasoned elaboration
is well placed. The Lerch arguments suggest that the norm-centered
view is a little too simple. Large parts of the Lerch negotiations consist of discussions like those in the preceding excerpts. In such discussions, norms are applied to facts, differences are identified,
effects of the norms are clarified, and substantive areas of disagree"principled" resolution on the merits. See supra note 34. In disputes grounded in competing conceptions of the good, analysis only narrows or clarifies differences so that
informed accommodations can be made. The main point of the text is that "speechmaking" is usually of little use, either in resolving differences or clarifying them.
Making better arguments will not guarantee that argument becomes the dominant influence on negotiation outcome. Disparities in resources and other forms of
power will no doubt continue to play their significant and often dispositive role. But
parties and lawyers value being correct (as opposed to "in the driver's seat"), and there
is leverage in being able to raise doubts about whether they are. Besides, good argument is usually no more difficult to make than bad, once one gets the hang of it, and in at
least those cases where research must be done anyway, the cost to the client is little or
nothing extra.
104. See Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 638.
105. Id. at 637-39.
106. Id. at 680.
107. Id. at 665.
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ment are narrowed. But these tasks are done so badly much of the
time that negotiators are often not much closer at the end of a discussion than at the beginning. This may be what the norm-centered
view thinks of as "focusing" legal norms, but if so, the picture rarely
becomes clear, and it is difficult to see how such a process could
"determine" negotiation outcome.
The claim that norm focusing occurs in proportion to the precision inherent in the norms themselves seems equally problematic.
Norm focusing differs widely in the Lerch tapes. Sometimes it is extensive and other times nonexistent, but in each negotiation norms
could be focused more precisely. Parties stop focusing not because
the norm is as precise as it can be made, but because they lack experience with the norm, are inadequately prepared, are intellectually
or emotionally unable to take the analysis further, or are prevented
from going further by limits of the situation. These factors, along
with tolerance for conflict, stamina, ruthlessness, oratorical skill,
and emotional force, play as large a role in determining the extent
to which norms are invoked and elaborated as do qualities inherent
in the norms themselves. It is not too strong to say that norms exist
interdependently with negotiators who invoke them. They are constituted anew in each discussion, not arbitrarily, but also not uniformly and not necessarily in a way that a perfectly informed
legislator or judge would say that the norm was intended to take
effect.'" 8 Individual negotiators define the contours of a legal
norm's life, and in the process become as important as the precision
inherent in the norm itself.
There may be more serious problems for the norm-centered
view. The Lerch negotiators regularly reported that their adversaries' invocation of legal norms had little influence on their decisions
of what and when to concede. Some admitted to marginal effects
(e.g., "his position isn't nearly so hopeless as I thought"), but most
found adversary arguments unpersuasive in every respect. They
made concessions, not because they were convinced or had doubts,
but because they "had to settle. ' 'iO 9 These reports might be wrong.
108. Understandings of substantive law can vary radically. See for example the variable assessments of the same case made by Rosenthal's panel of experts, D. ROSENTHAL,
LAWYER AND CLIENT: WHO's IN CHARGE 202-05 (1974). Cf White, TheJudicial Opinion
and the Poem: Ways of Reading, Ways of Life, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1669, 1693 (1984) ("[legal]
speakers constitute, or reconstitute, through their performance a social universe . . .
they define and make real a set of values . . . to which they appeal .... ").
109. One commentator has suggested that the "negotiators . . .realized that there
would be no judge or jury deciding the merits of the case if they did not settle" and this
caused them "to disregard the importance of argument." Letter from Gary Lowenthal
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The Lerch participants had heavy ego investments in their preparation and might have feared criticism if they acknowledged that their
adversaries told them something new. While participants agreed
that this could be a factor, most insisted that their opponents' views
were unpersuasive because wrong. In defending this appraisal,
many participants identified weaknesses in their adversaries' arguments that were similar or identical to weaknesses discussed in the
preceding sections (e.g., "he didn't tell me anything I didn't already
know;" "he wasn't on top of the cases-particularly Meachum;" "he
was confused, he didn't know what he wanted to say."). That they
failed to see the same deficiencies in their own arguments does not
suggest that these reports are wrong.
Corroborating the participants' above reactions is the fact that
no strong correlation seems to exist between outcome and argument much of the time. Admittedly, this is a subjective judgment. It
is difficult even to rank outcomes. For example, it is hard to know
whether a settlement for Lerch that succeeds on every minor issue
(e.g., right to inspect the file, expunge false material, enter new information) but loses on re-transfer, is better or worse than one in
which those terms are reversed. And few Lerch settlement comparisons present this simple a question. It is not possible to say with
certainty that outcome-argument correlations do not exist; the data
are too slippery for that. But watching the Lerch tapes, one cannot
help but be struck by the realization that the one who makes the best
arguments does not always prevail.
If argument does not shape outcome in a causally direct sense,
more needs to be said about what it means for dispute-negotiation
to author (Aug. 2, 1983). The point, I take it, is that in the absence of a real outcome
participants responded to sentiments that they otherwise might control. Three things
may be said about this.
First, to some difficult-to-measure extent, it is probably true. Simulations have
an irreducible element of gaming, which causes participants to "play" at their roles.
Second, playfulness was minimized because consequences followed from irrationally intransigent behavior. If agreement was not reached, each negotiator was required to support his decision to deadlock with a brief on the merits. See supra note 75. The briefs
were reviewed and anyone refusing to settle for insubstantial reasons was penalized with
a grade reduction.
Third, law students, as much as any subject population, are predisposed to make
argument the basis of settlement, because argument is the dominant element of law
student culture. In Lerch this predisposition was even stronger because the students had
limited experience with the Virginia prison system, and lacked lawyer "categories" to
tell them what the case was "worth." Without external evidence that play was the dominant motive (and there is very little), the most reasonable assumption is that the negotiators were serious. It would have appeared rude to their peers, and immature to their
instructors for them to be any less.
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to be "rule-determined." 1 ° For example, do rules enter negotiation as parts of threats, and have their principal effects in the
shadows of these more power based tactics? 1 1 If so, how do we
know that it is the rule that has force rather than the adversary's lack
of stamina, or his intolerance for conflict? Or do rules operate tacitly, as authoritative background norms that act as "slots" in the
"heads" of negotiators (developed during the negotiator's socialization in the law), 12 and take effect without being invoked explicitly?
Or are rules introduced in code (as in labor negotiation), 1 3 where a
phrase, idea, or piece of evidence automatically and unambiguously
conveys the full complexity of a point to the adversary, but not to
one reading a transcript of the exchange in another context? However rules are introduced and take effect, the assertion that negotiation is rule-determined requires a more finely nuanced analysis than
now exists, in which indirect as well as direct relationships between
argument and outcome are examined.'"'
C. Implicationsfor Justice and Morality
Argument can influence a decision to settle in at least three
ways. It can be true, recognized as such, and produce concessions
out of fully informed agreement. It can be unrebuttable within the
time frame of the negotiation, though not believed, and produce
concessions out of deference to greater skill. Or it can be invincibly
sincere and strongly felt, though patently wrong, and produce concessions out of a desire to avoid irrational and uneconomic deadlock. 1 5 Each type of argument works in different circumstances,
but only the first has a consistently direct connection to justice.
Truth is not all of justice, but it is a part of it in a way that skill and
sincerity are not. A person who has been fooled, intimidated, or
cajoled into believing that his legal rights do not exist, has not made
1 16
an informed and free choice to trade off those rights.
110. On rule determination, see Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 639 (discussion of the
invocation of rules in dispute-negotiation).
111. See supra note 11.
112. See G. Bellow, supra note 3, at 26-30.
113. See P.H. GULLIVER, supra note 6, at 129-30 (discussion of labor negotiations).
114. So that it is clear, I agree with Eisenberg and others that argument influences
negotiation outcome, and people who discount argument are wrong, but I suspect that
its effects are more often worked indirectly, in ways implied in the text, as a corollary to,
rather than as a direct outgrowth of, discussions about rules.
115. Cf Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 648-49 (parties likely to give some weight to another's good faith belief, even when disbelieved).
116. The justice of negotiation as a system depends upon more than correct moral
judgments by negotiators. Certain political questions also must be addressed. For ex-
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The Lerch arguments are more frequently sincere and skillful
(comparatively) than true. They reflect neither a view of truth-seeking as a necessary component of persuasion, nor a belief that bilateral investigation of hard issues is compatible with adversarial
advocacy. In fact, in discussions after their negotiations, many Lerch
participants were cynical about the power of law to settle or narrow
disputes. Such views are dangerous because they encourage routinized negotiation, in which problems are treated as types, and
"solved" in the abstract, and the settlements are imposed on clients."1 7 These views also encourage settlements that, in a significant sense, are lawless, that is, inconsistent or only coincidentally
consistent with existing law. When negotiation is practiced as in the
Lerch excerpts, valid legal claims will be abandoned unintentionally,
mistakenly, or on the basis of incorrect assumptions about their
worth, and when this happens, serious doubts are raised about the
fairness of private ordering.
There is a personal ethical dimension to this problem as well.
Inadequate legal argument may encourage a negotiator to devalue
the importance of moral constraints on negotiation argument. This
was a problem in the Lerch negotiations. Many of the participants
had no views on a number of obvious and frequently encountered
ethical questions. Should a negotiator conclude an agreement on
the basis of arguments known to be false, suspected of being false,
or not analyzed in terms of truth and falsity? And, if an agreement
based on a false understanding is legitimate, what authorizes lawlessness? If a court must approve a settlement, does the analysis
ample, should parties be limited in the resources they expend to levels that both parties
can meet? Should the lawyer-for-hire system be changed to prevent most of the lawyer
skill from gravitating to most of the client money? Should the time frame in which agreement is typically reached be extended so that quickness does not count more than
depth? Should bargaining be monitored to detect and penalize deceptive, manipulative,
and unconscionable tactics? Should "controversial" legal questions be referred to third
parties in the fashion of asking a state supreme court to construe ambiguous state law?
These questions are important, but this section's point is more narrow. It suggests that within a basically just legal system, individual moral choices about negotiation
argument must still be made. Taking every advantage the system allows is no more
presumptively moral than failing to take any advantage. Whether a particular argument
may or must be made is a matter for individual moral justification each time the opportunity for argument occurs. There is no system-based excuse from this responsibility,
and no denying that moral and political interests are at stake.
117. Cf D. ROSENTHAL, supra note 108, at 17-22 (traditional view of law practice is that
client problems have a single best, routine, and technical solution accessible only to
professional understanding). Compare Bobbitt, supra note 16, at 734 ("[I]gnoring ethical
approaches has yielded the cynical conclusion that mere political bias rather than argument governs much constitutional decision.").
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change? Does it matter if an argument takes advantage of a weakness in the system in which negotiation occurs, rather than a personal weakness of the adversary?" 8 Does a scrupulously honest
judgment that one's ends are legitimate justify false argument? And
may this judgment be made by a single individual, as an outgrowth
of a dialogue with himself?" 9 These questions are introductory but
complex, and one would not expect the Lerch nogotiators to have
fully developed positions. But the complete absence of views on the
issues suggests that the Lerch negotiators had not yet begun to ex20
amine seriously the moral dimensions of negotiation argument.
Lack of interest in ethical questions does not follow automatically
from the practice of arguing badly, but the prospect that one's argument is unethical is more difficult to contemplate if one knows of
only one (bad) way to proceed.
VII.

CONCLUSION

This article describes and analyzes characteristics of negotiation
argument and speculates about how those characteristics might retard or advance agreement and justice in dispute-negotiation. It
seeks to determine to what extent those characteristics are present
in actual dispute-negotiation, and to advance some tentative propositions about what the absence of such characteristics means to
negotiation theory and practice. The analysis is preliminary in every
respect. More study, particularly of argument's tacit and indirect
variations, is necessary before even a beginning understanding of
the complex relationship between the argument of positive law and
negotiation outcome is possible. Further study should be of actual
118. See Fried, supra note 28, at 1081-84. The "weakness of the system-weakness of
the individual" distinction is often specious. See Luban, The Adversary System Excuse, in
THE GOOD LAWYER, supra note 5, at 29-30.
119. See Arendt, Thinking and Moral Considerations, 38 Soc. RESEARCH 417 (1971).
120. The new Model Rules of Professional Responsibility include explicit standards
for lawyer negotiation behavior. See ABA Commission on Evaluation of Professional
Standards, Final Draft, Model Rules of Professional Conduct, A.B.A. J. (Pullout Supp. Nov.
1982). For commentaries on these provisions, see Brown & Dauer, supra note 33, at
529; Hazard, The Lawyer's Obligationto be Trustworthy When Dealing With Opposing Parties, 33
S.C.L. REV. 181 (1981); White, Machiavelli and the Bar: Ethical Limitations on Lying in Negotiation, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RESEARCH J. 926. The 1980 draft of the Model Rules had
more extensive and interesting provisions. See Text of the Initial Draft of Ethics Code Rewrite
Committee, § 4.0 Negotiator, Legal Times of Wash., Aug. 27, 1979, at 40-41. For additional discussions of the ethics of negotiation, see Rubin, Causerie on Lawyers' Ethics in
Negotiations, 35 LA. L. REV. 577 (1975); Schwartz, supra note 29; Schwartz, The Zeal of the
Civil Advocate, in THE GOOD LAWYER, supra note 5, at 150. For an empirical study of
lawyer attitudes about these issues, see Pepe, Standards of Legal Negotiations: Summary of Preliminary Findings (unpublished manuscript on file with author).
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cases insofar as that is possible. Simulation data is interesting, but
the reality of negotiation argument must be studied in its natural
setting if it is to be understood fully.
Aside from access to real life negotiation, the most difficult task
will be the reproduction of data complete enough to be realistic, but
parsimonious enough to be manageable. Ideally, the data should
include complete arguments, together with descriptions of the
negotiators' personal histories, the nature of their prior relationship, their respective levels of resources, skill, status, preparation,
and experience, the content of their nonverbal communication,
their states of mind when they argue, trade, and listen to arguments
by their adversaries, salient institutional, situational and social conventions and norms, and other factors that contribute either to the
leverage possessed by each party or the constraints within which the
discussions take place.
Reporting this information objectively and succinctly will not be
easily accomplished, and will require considerable methodological
inventiveness. Yet without such a complete picture, it will be difficult to identify authoritatively the proportionate degree of influence
argument has on negotiation outcome. Argument may be evaluated
against consensus standards, as here, and interesting patterns may
emerge, but a test of consensus standards themselves-to see if they
amount to more than aesthetic preferences-will require the full
range of contextual data just described.

